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I study selected fiscal policy issues both in the short-run and long-run using empirical methods.
In Chapter 2, I investigate the effects of increases in U.S. government expenditures on the private
sector in a real business cycle framework using maximum likelihood. I distinguish between the
consumption and the investment expenditure components of government purchases. This makes
the model sufficiently flexible to admit crowding-in and crowding-out effects of the two government
expenditures separately. I show that a 1% increase in government consumption increases output by
1.5%, while a 1% increase in government investment increases output by 0.0085%. In Chapter 3, I
analyze the international transmission of shocks to public expenditures in a two-country business
cycle model of saving and investment under perfect international capital mobility. I test the model
for its ability to account for some puzzles identified in the international real business cycle literature,
specifically the low cross-country consumption correlations, and the positive correlation between
national saving and investment over time. I show that a model with technology and government
spending shocks quantitatively explains the low consumption correlations across countries and the
high investment-saving correlation. In Chapter 4, we develop a new index which provides early
warning signals of fiscal sustainability problems for advanced and emerging economies. We use the
index to assess the build-up of fiscal stress over time since the mid-1990s in advanced and emerging
economies. We show that fiscal stress has increased recently to record-high levels in advanced
countries, reflecting raising solvency risks and financing needs. In emerging economies, we show
that risks are lower than in mature economies owing to sounder fiscal fundamentals, but fiscal stress
remains higher than before the crisis.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
In my research, I use empirical models and methodologies to address both short- and long-run fiscal
policy issues. In the three chapters, I investigate how government spending affects the private sector
over the business cycle, what types of government spending are more stimulating for private activity
than others, and whether different types of government spending explain the synchronization of
private activity across countries. Next, I turn to long-run considerations and investigate which fiscal
indicators can signal fiscal vulnerability before a crisis occurs, and whether there exist differences
in the vulnerability structure between emerging and advanced economies.
In Chapter 2, the effects of increases in U.S. government expenditures on the private sector
are investigated in a real business cycle framework using maximum likelihood. Distinction is made
between the consumption and the investment expenditure components of government purchases
using CES specifications over composite consumption and capital. This makes the model suffi-
ciently flexible to admit crowding-in and crowding-out effects of the two government expenditures
separately. Parameter estimates show that both government consumption and capital complement
private consumption and capital in the utility and production functions, respectively. This results
in crowding-in of private activity: A 1% increase in government consumption increases private
consumption by 0.55%, and output by 1.5%, while a 1% increase in government investment in-
creases private investment by 0.04% and output by 0.0085%. Furthermore, I show that government
expenditures help improve the model’s ability to account for labor market puzzles.
In Chapter 3, I analyze the international transmission of shocks to public expenditures in a
two-country business cycle model of saving and investment under perfect international capital mo-
bility. Distinction is made between the consumption and the investment expenditure components
of government purchases using CES specifications over composite consumption and capital. The
model is tested for its ability to account for some puzzles identified in the international real business
1
cycle literature, specifically the low cross-country consumption correlations, and the positive corre-
lation between national saving and investment over time. A model with technology and government
spending shocks quantitatively explains the low consumption correlations across countries and the
high investment-saving correlation. Public expenditure shocks are shown to improve the model’s
ability to match several moments in the data. Overall, I find in Chapters 2 and 3 that government
demand shocks significantly improve real business cycle models’ performance both domestically and
internationally.
The last Chapter has a similar fiscal policy flavor, but addresses different questions. In Chapter
4 (IMF working paper co-authored with Emanuele Baldacci, Iva Petrova, Nazim Belhocine, and
Gabriela Dobrescu), we develop a new index which provides early warning signals of fiscal sustain-
ability problems for advanced and emerging economies. Unlike previous studies, the index assesses
the determinants of fiscal stress periods, covering public debt default as well as near-default events.
The fiscal stress index depends on a parsimonious set of fiscal indicators, aggregated using the
approach proposed by Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998). The index is used to assess the
build up of fiscal stress over time since the mid-1990s in advanced and emerging economies. Fiscal
stress has increased recently to record-high levels in advanced countries, reflecting raising solvency
risks and financing needs. In emerging economies, risks are lower than in mature economies owing
to sounder fiscal fundamentals, but fiscal stress remains higher than before the crisis.
2
2.0 PUBLIC EXPENDITURES IN AN RBC MODEL: A LIKELIHOOD
EVALUATION OF CROWDING-IN AND CROWDING-OUT EFFECTS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
What are the effects of government expenditures on the private sector over the business cycle?
Although the answer to this question is of significant policy relevance and is central to the macroe-
conomics literature, it remains open to debate both theoretically and empirically. Indeed, there is
no agreement even on the qualitative effects concerning whether government spending crowds-in or
crowds-out private consumption and investment and on the effects on real wages. Clear answers to
these questions are crucial for understanding several policy issues, such as the effect of government
spending on GDP, the effectiveness of stimulus packages in recessions, and distinguishing between
competing predictions of alternative macroeconomic models.
Before reviewing the literature in detail, it is important to make an observation on the nature of
government expenditures. Most of the work done on the effects of fiscal policy shocks either treats
government spending as total government purchases (investment + consumption) or studies one of
these two components separately. Since one contribution of this paper is to take this composition
seriously by estimating the separate effects in a single model, this distinction is made clear in the
next review section and throughout the chapter.
Starting with government consumption, dating at least to the rise of the Keynesian paradigm,
there has been a vigorous debate on whether government consumption crowds-in or crowds-out
private activity. A standard neoclassical view argues for crowding-out: Government consumption
shocks induce negative wealth effects that crowd-out private consumption. A standard Keynesian
view argues for crowding-in, via the multiplier effect. Recent empirical evidence gleaned from VARs
suggests a tendency towards crowding-in; the purpose here is to investigate whether similar evidence
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emerges from the empirical analysis of a structural (dynamic stochastic general equilibrium) model.
As for government investment, the conventional view is that since government and private
capital are likely to be complementary in production, crowding-in is likely to prevail in this dimen-
sion (e.g., see Aschauer, 1989). However, the empirical evidence on this view, based on estimates
obtained using either production functions or VARs is mixed, and no clear consensus has emerged.
Here, I investigate the relationship between public and private consumption and investment
expenditures in an RBC framework specified as sufficiently flexible to encompass the possibility of
crowding-out or crowding-in along both dimensions. Along the consumption dimension, crowding-
out can occur for two reasons: either via a standard wealth effect or via a channel wherein gov-
ernment consumption substitutes for private consumption in the representative household’s CES
utility. But crowding-in is also possible due to two features of the model: first, through the same
CES aggregator in the utility function, wherein government consumption can complement private
consumption depending on the elasticity of substitution parameter; and second, through a non-
separable functional utility form specified such that consumption and leisure are substitutes. For
certain parameterizations of the model, each of these two features is capable of dominating the
wealth effect, leading to crowding-in (e.g., see Bouakez and Rebei, 2007; and Linnemann, 2006).
Along the investment dimension, crowding-out can similarly occur either via a wealth effect, or
if government capital substitutes for private capital in the CES production function. Crowding-in
takes place if government capital complements private capital in the CES production function.
Given the flexibility of the model, the nature of the relationship between government and private
consumption and investment amounts to an empirical question, which I evaluate by estimating the
model via maximum likelihood.
The maximum likelihood estimates I obtain indicate that both government consumption and
investment crowd-in private consumption and investment. Specifically, a 1% increase in government
consumption is found to increase private consumption by 0.55%, and output by 1.5%; while a 1%
increase in government investment increases private investment by 0.04% and output by 0.0085%.
Pappa (2005) also distinguishes between government consumption and investment in an RBC
model. This paper differs from his in many aspects. First, here the production function has a CES
form, allowing government investment shocks to generate either a crowding-in or a crowding-out ef-
fect on private activity. In contrast, in Pappa’s model public capital enters the production function
4
directly, thereby inducing a strict crowding-in effect. Second, the goal here is to derive conclud-
ing results on crowding-in versus crowding-out effects on private consumption and investment via
maximum likelihood. Pappa calibrates his model and compares it to a new-Keynesian version in
order to shed light on the two models’ different predictions regarding the real wage.
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the literature; Section 2.3 presents the
model; and Section 2.4 discusses the data. Section 2.5 then presents calibration exercises designed
to illustrate the model’s flexibility; there it is shown that alternative parameterizations can imply
opposing results. Section 2.6 then presents ML estimates that provide a clear resolution of the
alternate possibilities admitted under the model, yielding the crowding-in/crowding-out pattern
described above. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 THE EVIDENCE
2.2.1 Government Consumption
The empirical literature on public spending effects has struggled to provide robust stylized facts.
The main debate concerns (1) the specification of the reduced-form VAR model and (2) the approach
used to identify fiscal policy shocks. Traditionally, two major approaches have been used to identify
government shocks.
The first approach commonly referred to as narrative is based on the argument that increases
in military spending are good indicators of unanticipated policy shifts, which motivates the use of
dummy variables to identify unanticipated increases in military purchases in the U.S. economy. For
example, Ramey and Shapiro (1998) use this narrative approach to identify three major episodes
of military buildups in the US: the Korean War 1950:3, the Vietnam War 1965:1, and the Carter-
Reagan defense buildup 1980:1. Studies following this approach find that real wages and private
consumption tend to fall due to exogenous increases in defense purchases (e.g., see Ramey and
Shapiro, 1998; Edelberg et al., 1999; Burnside et al., 2004; Fisher and Peters, 2009; and Barro and
Redlick, 2010). Auerbach (2010) argues that this approach focuses on the effect of specific types of
shocks and cannot be generalized to evaluate broader policy effects such as short-run recessionary
periods.
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The second strand employs an identification strategy under which government spending is as-
sumed to be predetermined relative to innovations in other variables in the VAR within a quarter.
Here, government expenditures consist of both consumption and investment components. These
studies find that private consumption tends to rise after positive government spending shocks (e.g.,
see Fatas and Mihov, 2002; Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Gali et al., 2007; and Mountford and
Uhlig, 2009).
The sharp difference in results obtained using the narrative approach and standard VAR studies
has led to a series of recent papers. For example, Kamps and Caldara (2008) explore the role of
alternative identification approaches in generating differences in results. They find that private
consumption and the real wage rise in all of their approaches, except when following the narrative
approach. Ramey (2009) on the other hand argues that the difference in results arises due to a
timing issue. Since it is implicitly assumed in VAR studies that government shocks are unanticipated
by the private sector, the VAR might be missing the decline in consumption that occurred when
the news was learned. She concludes that after adjusting for anticipations, private consumption
falls. Tenholfen and Wolff (2007) follow a similar approach, but allow future identified shocks to
have an effect in standard VAR studies. They find that when anticipation is allowed, standard
VARs indeed show a decrease in private consumption to defense spending shocks. However, they
do not find that anticipation matters at all for other government spending components: private
consumption still rises due to a government spending shock even when allowing for anticipation.
Hence, there is still a clear debate concerning whether government spending shocks crowd-in or
crowd-out private consumption.
Just as the empirical evidence has been mixed, so too have theoretical predictions. In stan-
dard RBC models, a representative infinitely-lived household is assumed to optimize under rational
expectations. Government consumption shocks increase household incentives to work inducing neg-
ative wealth effects; this causes private consumption to decrease (e.g., see Christiano and Eichen-
baum, 1992; Baxter and King, 1993). In the Keynesian tradition on the other hand, expansionary
fiscal policies are thought to trigger increases in aggregate demand, triggering increases in produc-
tion, employment and consumption via the multiplier effect (e.g., see Blanchard, 2001). Empirical
evidence obtained using the narrative approach supports neoclassical economic theory, while the
evidence from VARs seems to support predictions of the Keynesian tradition. Nonetheless, some
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researchers have attempted to reconcile theory with evidence by introducing modifications both to
neoclassical and New Keynesian models that admit the possibility that private consumption may
increase following a government consumption shock. For example, Gali et al. (2007) construct a
New Keynesian model wherein consumption rises in response to a public consumption shock. Their
model features price stickiness, rule-of-thumb households and a monopolistic labor market. Linne-
mann and Schabert (2004) augment a New Keynesian model with a utility function that depends
on government consumption as well as private consumption. Linnemann (2006) and Bouakez and
Rebei (2007) make the same attempt for the neoclassical model. The former introduces a non-
separable utility specified wherein consumption and leisure are substitutes, and the latter assumes
government consumption affects household utility through a CES aggregator. All these studies use
DSGE models and show that private consumption can rise due to the modifications presented in
the models.
Note that although the VAR literature uses total government expenditures to study the effect on
private consumption, the literature using DSGE models summarized above focuses on government
consumption shocks only and abstracts from the investment component. In the next subsection,
I characterize a separate literature that focuses on the effects of public investment on the private
sector.
2.2.2 Government Investment
This strand of literature stems from a series of studies by Aschauer, who in 1989 argued that de-
creases in public investment in the US can explain the post-1970 productivity slowdown. Following
this work, alternate methodologies have been used to estimate the effects of government investment
shocks on the private sector, all of them based on reduced-form specifications.
One strand focuses on aggregate production functions augmented to include the public capital
stock as an input. For example, Aschauer (1989b) uses annual US data, Munnell (1990) uses pooled
annual US state data in levels and Finn (1993) looks at the effects of different components of public
capital. They all find positive effects of public capital on private investment and output. There are
however noted problems following this approach, mainly since the direction of causality between
government and private variables is ambiguous. In time series studies for example, government
investment can be higher when growth is higher, depending on whether policies are procylical or
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countercyclical. The same reasoning applies for state data in levels: richer states have more means
to invest. Indeed, when the production function is estimated with US data in differences, or with
state data with fixed effects, studies find zero or negative effects of public capital on private activity
(e.g., see Tatom, 1991; Hulten and Schwab, 1991; Evans and Karras, 1994; and Hotz-Eakin, 1994).
The second strand of the literature employs VAR techniques. Kamps (2005) summarizes 20
VAR studies, nearly half of which consider the effects of government investment for the US, while
others extend the analysis for other countries. The majority of these VAR studies consider a simple
model with four or five variables including public capital or public investment, private capital or
private investment, employment and output. The summary shows a clear divergence in results
depending on the country in question and on whether the data is annual or quarterly. When
annual data is used, these studies tend to find crowding-in effects (e.g., see Pereira, 2000 for the
United States; and Afonso and Aubyn, 2009 for 14 EU countries). In VAR studies with quarterly
data on the other hand, studies find insignificant or even negative effects of government investment
on private investment and output (e.g., see Voss, 2002; and Perotti, 2004). Furthermore, the US
and Canada seem to show insignificant or negative effects, while EU countries show positive effects
on output (e.g., see Kamps, 2005). One reason results differ depending on the frequency of data
used is that using annual data makes it difficult to analyze feedback effects from output to public
investment. These studies show that the empirical evidence for government investment is mixed,
and no clear consensus has emerged regarding its effects.
2.2.3 Discussion
The literature reviewed above has sought to identify the effects of (1) government total expenditures
in VAR frameworks; (2) government consumption expenditures in DSGE frameworks; and (3)
government investment expenditures in reduced-form frameworks. Here, I employ a DSGE model
sufficiently rich and flexible to admit the possibility of both crowding-in or crowding-out effects for
both government consumption and investment expenditures. I then use ML estimates to determine
the pattern of effects that appear most plausible when the data are viewed through the lens of the
model.
It is important to distinguish between the components of government expenditures in a struc-
tural model, because these shocks can generate very different macroeconomic effects. While both
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shocks lead to the absorption of resources by the government, and thus generate negative wealth
effects, other factors come into play that are distinct to each. In the public consumption case,
depending on the size of the complementarity between leisure and consumption, and on whether
public and private consumption are substitutes or complements, crowding-in may result in spite of
the negative wealth effect.
As for government investment, it is distinct from government consumption in that it increases
output directly in the production function. In this case, if the productivity of public capital is
sufficiently large, this could in theory overcome the wealth effect inducing a rise in both private
consumption and investment. In Pappa (2005), public capital crowds-in private capital automat-
ically due to the specification of their model, while the model estimated here allows for both
crowding-in and crowding-out effects. Further, here the model is estimated via maximum likeli-
hood while Pappa’s results are sensitive to alternate parameterizations considered in a calibration
exercise.
2.3 THE MODEL
2.3.1 Basic Features
The economy consists of a large number of identical households. The representative household’s ob-
jective is to maximize its expected discounted flow of utility given preferences defined over effective
consumption and leisure during each period t=0,1,2,...:
max
cpt,lt
U = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(Ct, lt) (2.1)
Here, E0 is the expectations operator conditional on information available at time 0; β ∈ (0, 1) is
the discount factor; u(.) is an instantaneous utility function; and Ct and lt are levels of effective
consumption and leisure. Preferences are given by:
u(Ct, lt) =
(Cγt l
1−γ
t )
1−φ
1− φ , (2.2)
where φ > 1 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and γ ∈ (0, 1) is consumption’s share relative
to leisure of instantaneous utility. As Linneman (2005) shows, this utility specification implies
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Ucl < 0 for φ > 1, which is a necessary but not sufficient condition for government consumption to
crowd-in private consumption.1 With this utility form, the negative wealth effect of a government
consumption shock reduces leisure, but raises the marginal utility of private consumption. If
this effect is sufficiently strong, private consumption will increase after the shock. The household
maximizes utility derived from consumption and leisure, knowing that every period it is constrained
with one unit of time to be allocated between two activities:
1 = nt + lt. (2.3)
By investing ipt units of output during period t, the household increases the capital stock kpt+1
according to the law of motion
kpt+1 = ipt + (1− δ)kpt, (2.4)
The aggregate public capital stock is likewise
kgt+1 = igt + (1− δ)kgt, (2.5)
where δ is the depreciation rate for both capital stocks.
2.3.2 CES Aggregators
Effective consumption Ct is divided into private and public consumption according to the CES
(constant elasticity of substitution) specification
Ct = [τc
ψ
pt + (1− τ)cψgt]1/ψ, (2.6)
where cpt and cgt denote private and public consumption,
1
1−ψ > 0 is the elasticity of substitu-
tion, and τ is a share parameter. The household’s production technology is the Cobb-Douglas
specification
yt = ztK
α
t n
1−α
t , (2.7)
where Kt and nt denote the inputs of aggregate capital and labor needed for the production process,
zt is a productivity or technology shock, and α is capital’s share of output. Aggregate capital Kt
embeds private and public capital according to the CES specification
Kt = [ωk
χ
pt + (1− ω)kχgt]1/χ, (2.8)
1The utility form u(Ct, lt) = log(Ct) + γlog(lt), on the other hand, precludes such a relationship unless utility
depends on government consumption.
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where 11−χ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution and ω is a share parameter. Finally, the economy
satisfies the income identity
yt = cpt + cgt + ipt + igt. (2.9)
Notice that when τ = 1, government consumption reflects a pure resource drain on the economy,
since it takes away resources but does not enter the utility function. For τ < 1, and ψ > γ(1− φ),
it can be shown that a unit increase in cgt decreases the marginal utility of private consumption,
so they act as substitutes; the opposite is true when ψ < γ(1−φ), where they act as complements.
Similar relationships hold for aggregate capital: When ω = 1 public capital is no longer an input
in production; when ω < 1 and χ < α public capital complements private capital; and if the
productivity of public capital is sufficiently large, private consumption and investment will increase
in response to an increase in public investment.
2.3.3 Shocks
To maintain proper alignment with the data, stationarity is induced in the model by eliminating
trends. Specifically, cpt, ipt, kpt, cgt, igt, and kgt are normalized by the common growth rate given
by g1−α , and all variables are expressed as deviations from steady states. Technology is specified
according to the following specification:
log(z˜t) = (1− ρz)log(z¯) + ρzlog(z˜t−1) + zt, (2.10)
where z¯ > 0, ρz ∈ (−1, 1), and zt ∼ N(0, σ2z).2
Government consumption and investment, cgt and igt are assumed to follow similar laws of
motion after detrending:
log(c˜gt) = (1− ρcg)log(c¯g) + ρcg log(c˜gt−1) + cgt, (2.11)
where ρcg ∈ (−1, 1) and cgt ∼ N(0, σ2cg);
log(˜igt) = (1− ρig)log(i¯g) + ρig log(˜igt−1) + igt, (2.12)
where ρig ∈ (−1, 1) and igt ∼ N(0, σ2ig).
2Tildes represent detrended values, and bars denote steady states.
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It is possible that government expenditures may respond endogenously to TFP innovations.
This is not modeled directly here, but endogeneity will be allowed for indirectly by estimating
potential non-zero correlations between the innovations: z and cg , and z and ig . Finally, gov-
ernment purchases are assumed to be entirely financed by lump-sum taxes:
cgt + igt = Tt. (2.13)
2.3.4 Model Solution
The equilibrium allocations for the model are found by solving the planner’s problem of maximizing
U subject to the production function equation (2.7), the laws of motion for both forms of capital (2.4
and 2.5), the income identity (2.9), the resource constraint (2.3), the laws of motion for government
expenditures (2.11 and 2.12), and the specification for technology (2.10).
To summarize, the vector denoting the collection of model variables is
xt =
[
log
yt
y¯
, log
cpt
c¯p
, log
ipt
i¯p
, log
nt
n¯
, log
lt
l¯
, log
kpt
k¯p
, log
kgt
k¯g
, log
zt
z¯
, log
cgt
c¯g
, log
igt
i¯g
]′
,
and there are 18 structural parameters
µ = [α β δ φ γ ρz σz ρcg σcg ρig σig g τ ψ ω χ Corr(z, cg) Corr(z, ig)].
The model does not have a closed-form solution. The system of equations is mapped into a
linearized system by taking a log-linear approximation around the steady states. The approximate
solution takes the form xt+1 = F (µ)xt + G(µ)νt+1, where νt+1 denotes the collection of struc-
tural shocks. I construct impulse response functions to trace the reaction of endogenous variables
over time, around the steady states, in response to innovations to the exogenous shocks: TFP,
government consumption, and government investment.3
2.4 DATA
In the data, private consumption is measured as non-durable goods and services, and private
investment is measured as real private fixed investment; both are measured in chained 2000 dollars.
3The implementation algorithm and computer code was supported by DeJong and Dave (2007).
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These come from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ FRED database. Hours worked are
measured as those worked in the nonfarm business sector, and come from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics’ (BLS) Establishment Survey.
I construct the data on government components using National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPA) tables produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. This is because they have a measure
for military consumption and investment that I deduct from the government series. This is done
to make sure the model is well-aligned with the data: it is not clear how government consumption
providing agents with utility can be mapped with “military consumption”, nor how public capital
entering the production function can be mapped with “military investment”. Furthermore, the VAR
literature discussed in the review section typically considers total government expenditures minus
defense components. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show plots of the military and non-military components of
real raw government consumption and investment expenditures. Military consumption constitutes
about 34% of total government consumption and military investment about 24% of total government
investment. After removing defense expenditures, the mean of government consumption to total
output is roughly 13% and the mean of government investment to output is 3%, where output is
measured as Yt = Cpt + Cgt + Ipt + Igt.
Figure 2.1: A Plot of U.S. Raw Government Consumption Decomposed in Two Components
It is worthwhile to note here that government consumption and investment both include expen-
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Figure 2.2: A Plot of U.S. Raw Government Investment Decomposed in Two Components
ditures on items such as general public service, public order and safety, economic affairs, housing
and community services, health, recreation and culture, education, and income and security. How-
ever, government consumption measures the value of these goods and services provided, while
government investment measures the value of the equipment, software and structures that the gov-
ernment uses in producing these goods and services.4 Hence, the measurement is well-aligned with
the model, wherein public capital is measured as accumulated government investment.
The sample period considered is 1955:I through 2008:I. All the series are quarterly, expressed
in per-capita terms and normalized by the potential aggregate labor force, using the civilian non-
institutional population aged 16 years and over. All series are seasonally adjusted except for
population. Trends are removed from the data by using the HP filter, which is sufficient for
eliminating trends including time-varying trends. Figure A.1 in the Appendix illustrates data;
solid blue lines are logged data values, and dashed lines are HP trends. Finally, although the model
variables are detrended, information regarding steady states and relative sample values will be
restored. This will provide critical identification for the parameter γ, where the fraction of hours
4For example, government consumption in the case of education includes wages and salaries paid to employ-
ees working in the education sector, while government investment includes payments on desks, the physical school
building, computers in labs, etc.
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worked will be a 1/3 in the steady state. This will be discussed further in Section 2.6.
2.5 MODEL IMPLICATIONS
Before estimating the model, and to provide intuition behind the implications of the model’s dy-
namics, I illustrate specific cases of how different parameterizations in the CES consumption and
production functions carry alternative implications for the relationship between public and private
variables. The set of parameter values is summarized in Table 2.1. The capital share parameter α,
the discount rate β, the depreciation rate δ, and the coefficient of relative risk aversion φ are set to
standard values, and γ is chosen so that hours worked in the steady state is 1/3. In calibrating the
autocorrelations and standard deviations of the government shocks, I run OLS regressions based
on the government consumption and investment series (Equations 8 and 9). I find the persistence
parameters ρcg and ρig to be low (0.684 and 0.683). Hansen and Wright (1992) calibrate ρcg to 0.96,
but their sample period is shorter. Others (e.g., see Linneman, 2006) simply set it to 0.9 without
discussing the reasons. Thus when calibrating the model in this way, a better representation of the
data comes with a cost of a lower quantitative effect of a government spending shock on private
activity. This will change with the estimated parameters I discuss later.
The standard deviation and autocorrelation of the technology shock were chosen to match those
of output in the data (Table 2.2 reports the targets matched). The growth rate g is calibrated to
satisfy: g = (1 − α) ∗ gˆy, where gˆy is the sample estimate of the growth rate of output (0.00472
for the period considered). Finally, c¯g/y¯ and i¯g/y¯ were restricted to match the means found in the
data.
2.5.1 A Government Consumption Shock
In order to isolate the effects of a government consumption shock, I set ω and χ to 1 in what
follows so that public capital has no effect on aggregate capital. Note that if τ and ψ are 1
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Table 2.1: Parameter Calibration
Parameter Value Description
α 0.33 Capital share parameter
β 0.99 Discount factor
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate of private and public capital
φ 1.5 Coefficient of relative risk aversion
γ 0.29 Consumption’s share relative to leisure of utility
ρz 0.87 Technology shock persistence parameter
σz 0.0037 Standard Deviation of the technology shock
ρcg 0.684 Public consumption shock persistence parameter
σcg 0.010 Standard deviation of the public consumption shock
ρig 0.683 Public investment shock persistence parameter
σig 0.026 Standard deviation of the public investment shock
g (0.00472) ∗ (1− α) Growth Rate
Table 2.2: Calibration Statistics: Matching Moments
Target Model Data
Autocorrelation of Y 0.89 0.89
Standard Deviation of Y 0.0120 0.0118
Autocorrelation of Cg 0.684 0.69
Standard Deviation of Cg 0.014 0.015
Autocorrelation of Ig 0.683 0.684
Standard Deviation of Ig 0.036 0.036
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as well, government consumption does not enter household utility. An increase in government
consumption reduces resources available to the private sector: Agents will respond by lowering
private consumption and working more so that consumption does not drop by much. This is a
well-known negative wealth effect documented, e.g. by Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) and
Baxter and King (1993).
If the household derives utility from government consumption (represented here using τ = 0.83),
the effect on private consumption depends on the elasticity of substitution.5 Figure 2.3 illustrates
the difference between a resource drain (τ and ψ = 1) and a case where government consumption
perfectly substitutes private consumption in the utility function (τ = 0.83 and ψ = 1). Clearly,
private consumption decreases more in the second case.
Figure 2.3: Impulse Response Functions to a 1% Increase in Government Consumption: Resource
Drain (Dashed), and Perfect Substitutes with Effect on Utility (Solid)
Figure 2.4 shows impulse response functions with different substitution values: Private con-
sumption can even increase in response to a positive government consumption shock if the degree
of complementarity is sufficiently strong to dominate the negative wealth effect.
A more detailed look at the log-linearized version of the model illustrates the effect of a change
5Public consumption constitutes about 17% of total consumption in the data.
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Figure 2.4: Impulse Response Functions to a 1% Increase in Government Consumption: Perfect
Substitutes with Effect on Utility (Dashed), Less than Perfect Substitutes (Dotted), and Comple-
ments (Solid)
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in government consumption on the marginal utility of private consumption, which is given by
∂λ˜t
∂c˜gt
= [γ(1− φ)− ψ] ∂C˜t
∂c˜gt
+ [(1− γ)(1− φ)] ∂l˜t
∂c˜gt
, (2.14)
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint at time t. We know
that ∂C˜t∂c˜gt is positive and equals (1 − τ) ∗ (
c¯g
C¯
)ψ, and ∂l˜t∂c˜gt has been shown to be negative for the
utility form used here.6
Note that if τ = 1, there are two ways government consumption can have effects in the model:
first through the resource constraint which induces a negative wealth effect; second through the
second part of equation 2.14 which is positive. Linnemann (2006) shows that the non-separable
utility form used here provides a necessary but not sufficient condition to generate a crowding-in
effect on private consumption. This is so because an increase in employment makes the household
want to consume more (consumption and leisure are substitutes). Since this effect has to be strong
enough to overcome the negative wealth effect, the model here is augmented with the possibility
that agents derive utility from public consumption. For example, if τ < 1 and ψ < γ(1−φ), public
and private consumption are complements.7 In figure 2.4, the solid lines show that the model
can generate a very strong quantitative complementarity effect: For a 1% increase in government
spending, private consumption can increase up to 0.25%. As for the effect on private investment,
the impulse response functions show that it decreases after the shock, since the government shock
is not sufficiently persistent, in which case private consumption doesn’t fall enough for investment
to rise.
Finally, Figures 2.5 and 2.6 consider the case where government and private consumption are
complements and tracks different impulse responses according to different parameterizations of
φ (Figure 2.5), and γ (Figure 2.6). As φ increases, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
decreases, implying lower changes in consumption in response to government shocks. Interestingly,
private investment increases for lower elasticities of substitution. For example, in the case where
φ = 5, the household increases hours worked but doesn’t increase consumption by much, which
allows for an increase in investment. Higher values of γ on the other hand are associated with lower
relative utility derived of leisure. This results in increasing hours worked, which in turn makes it
6See Linnemann (2006) for a detailed proof.
7The first part of the right hand side of equation 2.14 would be positive as a result.
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more productive for the agent to invest, generating higher increases in output.
Figure 2.5: Impulse Response Functions to a 1% Increase in Government Consumption (ψ = −1):
φ = 1.5 (Dashed), φ = 3.5 (Dotted), and φ = 5 (Solid)
2.5.2 A Government Investment Shock
In order to understand how shocks to government investment expenditures are different from shocks
to government consumption expenditures, I set τ and ψ to 1 and examine the effects of different
values of the public capital CES parameters on private variables. If both ω and χ are 1, government
investment behaves the same way as government consumption that doesn’t affect household utility:
It acts as a resource drain and does not affect marginal products. However, government investment
may be used by the private sector for its required purposes in a way that it either encourages or
competes with private activity. I set ω to 0.83 making public capital an input in the aggregate
production function.8 The effect of an increase in public capital on the marginal product of private
capital is given by:
∂λ˜t
∂k˜gt
= (α− χ)∂K˜t
∂k˜gt
+ (1− α) ∂n˜t
∂k˜gt
, (2.15)
8Like government consumption, government investment is 17% of total investment in the data.
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Figure 2.6: Impulse Response Functions to a 1% Increase in Government Consumption: γ = 0.99
(Dashed), γ = 0.49 (Dotted), and γ = 0.29 (Solid)
where ∂K˜t
∂k˜gt
is positive and equals (1 − ω) ∗ ( k¯g
K¯
)χ. Public capital increases the productivity of
private capital when χ < α. If this effect is strong enough, government investment shocks crowd-in
private activity. Figure 2.7 illustrates different parameterizations of ω and χ. Private investment
decreases the most when public capital enters the production function, and perfectly substitutes
private capital (ω = 0.83 and χ = 1 as indicated by the dotted lines). Finally, I set χ to −0.5 to
illustrate the crowding-in effect shown with the solid lines. The contractionary effect dominates in
the earlier periods due to government absorption of resources. However, as the capital stock builds
up, both private consumption and investment eventually increase.
2.6 MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION
The model has 18 parameters contained in µ describing preferences, technology, and the stochastic
behavior of the exogenous shocks. Since the representation of the model is linear, and stochastic
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Figure 2.7: Impulse Response Functions to a 1% Increase in Government Investment: Resource
Drain (Dashed), Substitutes (Dotted), and Complements (Solid)
innovations normally distributed, the likelihood function is evaluated via the Kalman Filter.9 The
observable variables of the model are taken as private consumption and investment, hours worked,
and government consumption and investment, and denoted as Xt. Using the solution of the sys-
tem, and given a specification for the parameter space µ, I form the parameters of the state-space
representation. Since there are more observable variables than structural shocks, various combi-
nations of observable variables are predicted to be deterministic (e.g., see Ingram, Kocherlakota
and Savin, 1994). This stochastic singularity problem is avoided by augmenting the observation
equations of the Kalman Filter with measurement errors. The observation equation is given by
Xt = H(µ)
′xt + ut, where xt is the full vector of model variables.
A first attempt to estimate the model using a simplex method reveals, as in Ireland (2001), that
the data do not contain sufficient information to estimate all of the model’s parameters. Specifically,
the parameters α and δ prove difficult to identify. To circumvent this problem, I fix α and δ to 0.33
and 0.025, respectively, prior to estimation.10 Additionally, I impose restrictions on the parameters
9This method has been used in DSGE models by McGrattan (1994) and Ireland (2001) among others.
10These values are widely accepted in the RBC literature. Fortunately, they do not bear directly on the issue of
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in order to match the relative steady states of private consumption, private investment, government
consumption and government investment to output, as well as the steady state of hours worked
found in the data. Moreover, each parameter is restricted to lie in an economically plausible interval.
Three measurement errors (corresponding to the private investment, government consumption and
government investment series) hit their zero lower bound, so they were fixed at zero as a result.
Finally, a simulated annealing method has been used in optimization. This algorithm has proved
more likely than other methods to find the global optimum and deal with difficult functions, and
with ridges and plateaus.11 The basic idea behind why simulated annealing is more powerful than
other methods lies in that it explores the entire surface of the likelihood function, and optimizes
the function by making both uphill and downhill moves.12
This estimation method revealed another problem: the CES shares hit boundary solutions for
some starting values. As a result, the shares τ and ω were both fixed at 0.83, since government
consumption and investment constitute around 17% of total consumption and investment, respec-
tively. This should not be a problem since the focus of this paper is to uncover the crowding-in
and crowding-out effects of government variables on the private sector, which are indicated by the
elasticity of substitution parameters, and not the share parameters. These restrictions, as well as
estimation results, are reported in Table 2.3. Further, Figure A.2 in the Appendix depicts the
likelihood function around some of the estimated parameters, by changing one parameter at a
time, while Figure A.3 shows the likelihood surface and corresponding contours by changing two
parameters at a time, with a focus on the two most important parameters ψ and χ.13 Overall, the
parameters seem to be well identified, with clear peaks around their estimates.
The computation of standard errors was based on the Fisher information matrix.14 Standard
errors associated with parameter estimates were computed using 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations,
wherein the variance covariance matrix was calculated using artificial data generated using the
crowding-out versus crowding-in.
11Indeed, based on 75 different initial starting values, the simulated annealing method found a better global
optimum than a gradient-based method.
12Goffe et al. (1994) test simulated annealing on four statistical models and show that it outperforms other methods
in finding the global optimum. I make use of their Gauss code implementation in this paper.
13The likelihood surfaces corresponding to the remaining parameters are similar to those reported here and are
available upon request.
14Under some regularity conditions, the Fisher information matrix can be written as negative of the Hessian matrix.
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Table 2.3: Maximum Likelihood: Parameter Estimation Results
Parameter Estimatea Description
β 0.9942 Discount factor
(1.06e-007)
φ 3.3863 Coefficient of relative risk aversion
(4.44e-006)
γ 0.9958 Consumption’s share relative to leisure of utility
(1.21e-007)
ρz 0.9603 Technology shock persistence parameter
(0.019)
σz 0.0033 Standard Deviation of technology shock
(0.0002)
ρcg 0.8739 Public consumption shock persistence parameter
(1.22e-005)
σcg 0.0033 Standard deviation of public consumption shock
(0.0002)
ρig 0.7241 Public investment shock persistence parameter
(0.0010)
σig 0.0265 Standard deviation of public investment shock
(0.0020)
ψ -4.860 Substitution parameter - public and private consumption
(1.36e-005)
χ -0.383 Substitution parameter - public and private capital
(7.73e-005)
Σucp 0.0054 Private consumption - measurement error parameter
(2.95e-005)
Σun 0.017 Hours worked - measurement error parameter
(7.62e-005)
Corr(z, cg ) -0.297 Correlation between innovations to TFP and government consumption
(0.1560)
Corr(z, ig ) 0.250 Correlation between innovations to TFP and government investment
(0.2047)
a: The restrictions imposed on the parameters are β ∈ (0, 1), φ ∈ (0, 15), γ ∈ (0, 1), ρz, ρcg , ρig ∈
(0, 1), σz, σcg , σig ,Σucp ,Σuip ,Σucg ,Σuig ,Σun ∈ (0, 0.05), ψ and χ ∈ (−5, 1), and Corr(z, cg ) and Corr(z, ig ) ∈
(−1, 1).
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estimated parameter values.15 Standard errors were then simply computed as the square root
of the diagonals of the variance covariance matrix. Finally, this leads to the classical inference
procedure, wherein a 95% confidence interval based on the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE)
is:
CI = [µMLE − 2s.e., µMLE + 2s.e.]
where s.e. corresponds to the standard errors of the residuals for government consumption and
investment.
2.6.1 Implications for Crowding-in and Crowding-out Effects
2.6.1.1 Government Consumption Starting with standard parameters, the estimated value
of β of 0.995 (s.e.s.1.06e− 007) is precise and implies a quarterly discount rate of 0.6%. Regarding
the estimate of the coefficient of relative risk aversion φ, the estimated value here of 3.38 (4.44e−006)
is higher than found in some other studies, but in line with papers such as DeJong and Ripoll (2006)
who similarly estimate φ around 3.5. This estimated value indicates the agent’s desire to smooth
consumption, and proves key in helping the model generate the increase in the real wage due to a
government consumption shock, which is also observed in VAR studies.16 The high estimate of γ of
0.995 (1.21e− 007) indicates that the agent places a high weight on consumption relative to leisure
in instantaneous utility.17 This helps create the required volatility in hours worked to match the
second moments related to labor market puzzles.18
Turning to the parameters of the shocks, the technology and government consumption shocks are
more persistent than their calibration counterparts, which implies amplified effects on the private
sector. The persistence of government investment, on the other hand, is closer to its calibrated
value. The innovations to TFP and government consumption and investment are found to be −0.29
(0.15) and 0.25 (0.20), respectively, indicating relatively small feedback effects from innovations to
15This relies on the following theorem: For large iid samples of size n,
P (µMLE |µ0) = N(µ0, [IX(µMLE)]−1) = N(µ0, [nIXi(µMLE)]−1),
where I represents the Fisher information matrix, X is the data set used in estimation, and Xi corresponds to the
ith simulated data set.
16This takes place after 8 quarters in the estimated impulse response functions presented in Figure 2.8.
17Note that the steady state of hours worked is still 1/3.
18This is dicussed in detail in Subsection 2.6.2.
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Figure 2.8: Impulse Response Functions to an Estimated Government Consumption Shock with
95% (Dashed) Confidence Intervals
output to innovations to government spending.
Of special interest are the parameters related to substitutability/complementarity. These are ψ
for government consumption and χ for government investment. The approximate estimate of ψ of
−4.86 (1.36e− 005) makes it much lower than γ ∗ (1− φ) implying a crowding-in effect, as shown
in the impulse response functions in Figure 2.8. This estimate implies an elasticity of substitution
of 0.17 between private and government consumption, meaning they are complements.
Earlier studies that looked at the substitutability between private and government consumption
report mixed results depending on the functional utility form assumed. For example, Aschauer
(1985) assumes a linear utility form and find the two types of spending to be substitutes, while Ni
(1995) assumes a non-separable utility form and finds them to be complements. Here, a more general
non-linear CES form is assumed, which encompasses both forms of utility mentioned. Bouakez and
Rebei (2007) recently use a CES form and report an elasticity of 0.33. However, there is an
additional amplification effect here through which government consumption can cause crowding-in.
The assumption that utility is non-separable in consumption and leisure further creates interesting
26
dynamics in the labor market, as government consumption can affect private consumption through
more than one channel. In addition to directly substituting or complementing private consumption,
the effect on hours worked has further complementary effects on private consumption. Last, the
parameters here are jointly estimated and depend on crucial parameters such as φ, γ, and χ.
Overall, estimation results indicate a much stronger quantitative result than was shown in the
calibration exercise. Specifically, one standard-deviation innovation to government consumption
induces a 0.34% increase in government consumption. This estimated government shock causes
private consumption to rise by about 0.2%. This amounts to a rough 0.55% increase in private
consumption in response to a 1% increase in government consumption. Note that the maximum
increase observed in the calibration exercise was around 0.25% for a 1% increase in government
consumption.
There are two reasons behind this result. First, the substitutability between consumption
and leisure is strong enough to overcome the absorption of resources; this is better illustrated by
examining the response of hours worked, increasing to about 0.7%. Second, the complementarity
between government consumption and private consumption in the CES function is also high, as
indicated by ψ.
As for the effects on output, the impulse response functions reveal that output rises by 0.5%,
implying an approximate 1.5% increase due to a 1% increase in government consumption. This
result should not be surprising, as similar evidence arises from VAR estimates. For example, Gali
et al. (2007) report high output multipliers, some of which are greater than 1, depending on the
sample period, and how many variables are included in the VAR. Similarly, the New-Keynesian
model they develop features higher than 1 output multipliers as well.
While the VAR literature concludes that private consumption is crowded-in by government
consumption, it does now show clear results concerning the response of private investment to a
government consumption shock. For example, Fatas and Mihov (2002) estimate a positive response
while others such as Kamps and Caldara (2008), and Blanchard and Perotti (2002) estimate small
or insignificant effects. The estimates here indicate that private investment persistently rises (by
almost 2%), since the increase in hours worked makes investment affordable to the household.
While this estimate strikes as being high, note that private investment in the data is typically
seven times more volatile than private consumption. Second, had the estimate of ψ been lower
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(−2.86 instead of −4.86 for example), the increase in private investment would have been lower as
well, but this would come at a cost of hindering the match of other second moments with their
data counterparts.19
2.6.1.2 Government Investment As for the government investment parameters, the approx-
imate estimate of χ of −0.38 (7.73e− 005) is lower than α. This implies a complementarity effect
in the CES production function, as indicated in Figure 2.9. Specifically, the estimated government
shock of size 2.6% causes private investment to rise by about 0.1%. This amounts roughly to a
0.04% increase in private investment in response to a 1% increase in government investment. The
effects on output are lower, where an increase of 0.0085% is noted for a 1% increase in government
investment. The effects of government investment on the real wage are similar to those found for
government consumption. The real wage increases in both cases, confirming the impulse responses
found in VAR studies that use the sum of government consumption and investment as their measure
for government spending.
Figure 2.9: Impulse Response Functions to an Estimated Government Investment Shock with 95%
(Dashed) Confidence Intervals
19These are discussed in Subsection 2.6.2.
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Earlier studies that looked at the effect of government capital on private activity have either
used reduced-form regressions or VAR models, and find mixed results depending on the assumptions
or identification method used. Aschauer(1989) and Munnell (1990) estimate very high values of
the elasticity of output with respect to public capital (0.39 and 0.34, respectively). Lynde and
Richmond (1992) find a smaller but still significant estimate of 0.2 using time series techniques.
These studies however ignore state or time-effects. Once these are controlled for, papers find an
estimate very close to zero (e.g., see Holtz-Eakin, 1994, Hulten and Schwab, 1991; and Tatom,
1991).
In this paper, I estimate the elasticity of substitution assuming a CES form, as well as use a
structural model for that purpose. This takes into account possible non-linearities without imposing
the assumption that public capital is a direct complementary input in production. The estimated
elasticity parameter confirms the conventional wisdom on the noted crowding-in effects of public
capital, via the channel where it encourages and complements private activity. However, the output
elasticity with respect to public capital of 0.0085 is much smaller than found in studies such as
Aschauer (1989) using the production function approach and Pereira (2001) using VAR. Contrary
to the conventional wisdom, the findings presented here show that government consumption is more
stimulating for output than government investment. One potential reason behind this result is that
government capital takes a longer time to be built, consequently delaying the effects on output.
The impulse response functions in Figure 2.9 confirm this intuition: Private capital does not start
accumulating until the 12th quarter.
Another potential reason is that the focus here is on aggregate spending. A large fraction of
government consumption consists of spending on education (25%), which is found to be comple-
mentary to private activity in studies using disaggregated data (e.g., see Evans and Karras, 1994).
Government investment’s largest component, on the other hand, is spending on economic affairs
(35%), while education spending constitutes about 15% of total government investment.
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2.6.2 Implications for Second Moments
Finally, it is of interest to look at statistics implied by the estimated model. Table 2.4 shows that
they closely match those found in the data.20 The model accounts well for the volatility of private
consumption, investment and even hours worked relative to output. It also replicates well the
first-order autocorrelations of the series, and to a good extent the correlations across series. More
importantly, the estimated model accounts well for a puzzle observed in RBC models, which is their
inability to replicate some moments related to labor market behavior. Christiano and Eichenbaum
(1992) and Hansen and Wright (1992) document that the prototypical RBC model cannot account
for the low correlation between real wages and hours worked, or the high volatility of hours worked
relative to real wages. Following Hansen and Wright (1992), average productivity is used as a proxy
for real wages and denotes output divided by hours worked.21 This can be seen in the table, where
the calibrated version of the model shows that the standard deviation of hours worked relative to
the real wage is 0.51 and the correlation between these two series is high.22
The reason behind why the estimated model fares so well is that an increase in government
spending shifts the supply of labor, and hours worked increase while the real wage falls. These
dynamics don’t arise when considering productivity shocks alone, since an increase for the demand
of labor causes both hours worked and the real wage to increase. The labor supply channel is
further magnified in the estimated model by the agent’s higher preference for consumption relative
to leisure (γ = 0.995.)
20Second moments were computed at the model’s estimated parameters (e.g., see McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright,
1997).
21Hansen and Wright (1992) report that the empirical correlation between hours worked and average productivity
lies between −0.35 and 0.10, depending on the series used for hours worked. The empirical correlation presented here
is lower. First, they use GNP as their measure for output, while the sum of total consumption and investment is
used here. Second, they use a shorter data sample. We perform a sensitvity analysis and show that the correlation
between hours worked and productivity can differ depending on the definition of output used. When we use GNP as
the output measure and the shorter data series of Hansen and Wright (1992) from 1955 through 1988, the correlation
drops to -0.34. Their measure for the relative standard deviation between the two series on the other hand lies
between 1.37 and 2.15, and is closer to that reported here.
22In the calibrated model, I assume that government consumption and investment do not enter in the CES functions,
and are simply resource drains.
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Table 2.4: Actual, Calibrated, and Estimated Moments
Measurea Datab Estimated Model Calibrated Modelc
σy˜ 0.01 0.01 0.01
σc˜p 0.01 0.01 0.01
σi˜p 0.05 0.05 0.04
σn˜ 0.02 0.02 0.01
σc˜g 0.02 0.01 0.01
σi˜g 0.04 0.04 0.04
σc˜p/σy˜ 0.64 0.53 0.70
σi˜p/σy˜ 4.06 4.12 2.92
σn˜/σy˜ 1.46 1.53 0.39
σc˜g/σy˜ 1.26 0.59 1.14
σi˜g/σy˜ 3.07 3.33 2.96
σn˜/σw˜ 1.70 0.92 0.51
Corr(y˜, y˜l) 0.89 0.88 0.89
Corr(c˜p, c˜
l
p) 0.85 0.95 0.98
Corr(˜ip, i˜
l
p) 0.90 0.85 0.84
Corr(n˜, n˜l) 0.90 0.91 0.83
Corr(c˜g, c˜
l
g) 0.69 0.87 0.68
Corr(˜ig, i˜
l
g) 0.68 0.72 0.68
Corr(c˜p, y˜) 0.90 0.92 0.83
Corr(˜ip, y˜) 0.91 0.96 0.92
Corr(n˜, y˜) 0.82 0.18 0.73
Corr(c˜g, y˜) 0.22 0.78 0.02
Corr(˜ig, y˜) 0.32 0.04 0.01
Corr(n˜, w˜) -0.75 -0.81 0.45
aw refers to the real wage measured by output divided by hours worked following Hansen and Wright (1985). The
superscript l denotes lagged values.
bThe statistics are based on logged and HP filtered quarterly data for the period 1955:I - 2008:I.
cThe parameters in Table 2.1 are used to calculate the moments based on the calibrated model. The CES
parameters are all set to 1.
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2.7 CONCLUSION
The empirical evidence on the effects of fiscal spending shocks can be explained through many
mechanisms. The empirical evidence from VAR is mixed both for public consumption and public
investment effects, and no clear resolution has emerged. In this paper, I presented a structural
model flexible enough to generate either increases or decreases in private consumption and invest-
ment depending on the parameters used. When estimated, it shows crowding-in effects of public
consumption and investment. Specifically, government consumption has higher multipliers than
government investment: a 1% increase in government consumption increases private consumption
by approximately 0.55%, and output by 1.5%, while a 1% increase in government investment in-
creases private investment by 0.04% and output by 0.0085%. Additionally, the estimated model
accounts for observed second moments in the data fairly well.
Finally, I have assumed in this paper that government expenditures were entirely financed by
lump-sum taxation. Future work needs to relax this assumption, as distortionary taxation can
have counterproductive effects on the private sector. Future work also needs to relax the Ricardian
Equivalence assumption and estimate multipliers under different financing scenarios. Multipliers
can also be estimated differently in expansions and in recessions under certain government feedback
rules.
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3.0 PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS CYCLE
PUZZLES
3.1 INTRODUCTION
There are two well-known stylized facts observed in industrialized countries that an open real
business cycle model fails to account for. First, current account balances are found to be small,
that is national saving and investment move together (e.g., see Feldstein and Horioka henceforth
FH; 1980). This finding has been documented as evidence against perfect capital mobility. We
would expect that in a small open economy, additional savings should be invested around the world
in countries where those savings can earn the highest expected rates of return, not necessarily
affecting domestic investment. The second puzzle is that cross-country consumption correlations
are found to be low relative to output correlations (e.g., see Backus, Kehoe and Kydland henceforth
BKK; 1992 and Ambler, Cardia and Zimmerman; 2004). In theory, we would expect that even if
output correlations are low across countries, consumption correlations should still be high because
of international risk-sharing.
The international macroeconomics literature is not short of documentation and potential expla-
nations to each of these puzzles. However, a few of these explanations allow for a government sector
and none take the composition of government spending seriously, and the puzzles still remain. This
paper explores the possibility that the public sector has a central role to understanding capital
flows across countries. The question here is whether realistic government expenditure processes are
quantitatively able to bring simulated private international consumption and investment-saving
correlations in the range of what we observe in the data.
This paper shows that the observed international comovements can be rationalized by a standard
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model once two forms of government purchases are
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allowed to generate aggregate fluctuations. In particular, government consumption and investment
shocks are introduced in the model. Government consumption shocks were first introduced in
real business cycle models by Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) and Baxter and King (1993)
because of their ability to help account for some aspects of the labor market. As for government
investment shocks, Aschauer (1989a and 1989b) were the first to argue that public capital can be
used as an input in aggregate production. Mazraani (2010) estimates in post-war US data that
both government consumption and investment shocks have complementary effects on the private
sector in the utility and production functions, respectively. These shocks are proved to help account
for international business cycle puzzles in this paper.
The intuition behind the ability of government spending shocks to resolve these two puzzles
is straightforward. Due to a government investment shock taking place in one country, private
economic activity is boosted through the complementarity channel with private investment. Private
investment and output and saving increase as a result: This helps explain the FH puzzle. Hence,
saving and investment can be positively correlated due to an omitted factor other than technology
shocks in a setting where capital is assumed to be mobile across the two countries. Government
investment shocks are found to be as quantitatively able to explain the puzzle as technology shocks.
Government consumption purchases are used to explain the BKK puzzle. Wen (2007) argues
that consumption demand shocks in a general equilibrium model can explain the low cross-country
consumption correlations observed in the data. The argument is that preference shocks are country-
specific causing consumption expenditures to be less synchronized across countries. However, in
their setting shocks to consumption demand only come from preference changes which are unob-
servable in the data. This paper can be viewed as an attempt to give these preference shocks a name
in order to quantitatively test the implied correlations. Here, government consumption shocks are
used as a proxy for preference country-specific disturbances. Since these are observable in the data,
consumption demand will be exogenously given as a result. These shocks are quantitatively able
to explain that consumption correlations are low across countries.
The chapter proceeds as follows: Sections 3.2 and 3.3 review the empirical findings as well as
potential explanations in the literature of the two puzzles summarized and clearly discusses the
paper’s contribution; Section 3.4 presents the model; and Section 3.5 discusses the data. Section
3.6 presents the calibrated parameters, and Section 3.7 presents calibration exercises designed to
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illustrate the model’s intuition. Section 3.8 then presents moments’ results and sensitivity checks.
Section 3.9 concludes.
3.2 THE FH PUZZLE
Feldstein and Horioka estimated cross-country regressions of long period averages of investment
on saving over the 1960-1974 period for 16 OECD countries and found the so-called retention
coefficient to be close to unity. This sparked an immense literature testing this hypothesis for
different countries and time spans, examining what the coefficient means, and providing various
explanations for the mismatch with the theory. While authors such as Blanchard and Giavazzi
(2002) claim that the relationship between saving and investment in the euro area has declined
substantially over time, others including Feldstein (2005) argue that while the link has become
weaker for the smaller OECD countries, it remains high for larger ones. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000)
and Kim (2001) similarly confirm the FH findings with more recent data.
Much of the literature has attempted to build models that can predict high investment-saving
correlations as observed in the data, while maintaining the assumption that capital is perfectly
mobile. Several studies have explained the puzzle with technology shocks (e.g., see Baxter and
Crucini; 1993 and Mendoza; 1991). Other explanations have attributed it to high population
growth (e.g., see Obstfeld; 1986), non-traded goods (e.g., see Tesar; 1993), asymmetric information
(e.g., see Gordon and Bovenberg; 1996), and trade costs (e.g., see Obstfeld and Rogoff; 2000).
The argument in this paper is that government investment shocks can have the same effect
on private activity as technology shocks. Investment shocks that complement private investment
increase productivity and output, causing the high saving-investment correlation. While Cardia
(1991) explores the role of government expenditures in affecting the FH puzzle, their analysis
abstracts away from the fact that government investment might have complementarity effects on
the private sector. In their paper, government shocks are solely government consumption shocks
that act as a resource drain on the economy. The distinction between government consumption
and investment is important for the purposes of this paper since these two expenditures have very
different effects on private activity. In particular, government investment shocks can be interpreted
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as supply shocks, while government consmption shocks work along the demand dimension.
3.3 THE BKK PUZZLE
In open economies, countries experience different shocks to their technologies. This might cause
output fluctuations in different countries to be imperfectly correlated. With complete markets
where agents can share risk internationally however, we expect to see a large correlation between
consumption fluctuations across countries. Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992) report that in the
data, findings are reversed. They report that the consumption correlation between the US and
Europe for example is 0.46, compared to an output correlation of 0.70 between the two countries.
They attribute this finding to barriers of international trade in goods and assets.
Other explanations in the literature include fluctuations in non-traded goods (e.g., see Tesar;
1993), taste shocks (e.g., see Stockman and Tesar; 1995), trade costs (e.g., see Obstfeld and Rogoff;
2000), and demand shocks (e.g., see Wen; 2007). In this paper, a different approach is used wherein
government consumption shocks providing agents with utility can similarly help explain the BKK
puzzle. Since government consumption purchases cannot be relocated internationally, government
consumption shocks create a wedge between domestic and foreign consumption. In that sense, it
can be interpreted as the taste shock of Stockman and Tesar (1995), or the preference shock of
Wen (2007).
The closest papers to the approach followed here are those of Marrinan (1999) and Roche
(1996). In their setting, government consumption affects private utility in a linear fashion and
different values of substitutability are explored under which the consumption correlations implied
by the model can match those in the data. They find that government shocks can help explain
the puzzle only if they are extremely persistent and if they are not strong substitutes with private
consumption. Mazraani (2010) estimates however government consumption shocks to be strong
complements with private consumption. In that paper, the complementarity effect is found to be
highly amplified through the substitutability between leisure and private consumption. Since a high
complementarity is needed to resolve the BKK puzzle, the format of that paper will be followed.
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3.4 THE MODEL
The model employed extends that of Baxter and Crucini (1993) to include a government sector.
There is a single consumption good produced in two countries. In addition, there are two forms of
consumption and capital, both private and public.
3.4.1 Households
In the model, the economy in each country consists of a large number of identical households.
The representative household’s objective in country i = h, f (home and foreign) is to maximize
his expected discounted flow of utility given his preferences defined over effective consumption and
leisure during each period t=0,1,2,..., as described by the utility function:
max
cipt,lit
U = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(Cit, lit) (3.1)
Here, E0 is the usual expectations operator conditional on the information available at time 0 and
β is the discount factor, with β ∈ (0, 1). u(.) is an instantaneous utility function, and Cit and lit are
levels of effective consumption and leisure chosen in country i at time t. Preferences are specified
according to:
u(Cit, lit) =
(Cγitl
1−γ
it )
1−φ
1− φ , (3.2)
where φ > 1 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and γ ∈ (0, 1) is consumption’s share relative
to leisure of instantaneous utility. Effective Consumption Cit is divided into private and public
consumption according to a CES (constant elasticity of substitution) specification:
C(cipt, cigt) = [τc
ψ
ipt + (1− τ)cψigt]1/ψ, (3.3)
where 11−ψ is the elasticity of substitution, τ , and 1− τ are share parameters of private and public
consumption, respectively.
The household in each country maximizes his utility derived from consumption and leisure,
knowing that every period it is constrained with one unit of time to be allocated between two
activities:
1 = nit + lit. (3.4)
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3.4.2 Firms and Government
The household’s production technology is a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas function, with
a CES capital aggregator:
yit = zitK
α
itn
1−α
it , (3.5)
where Kit and nit denote the inputs of aggregate capital and labor needed for the production
process in country i, zit is a country-specific productivity disturbance, and α is capital’s share of
output. Aggregate capital Kit embeds private and public capital according to the CES specification
Kit = [ωk
χ
ipt + (1− ω)kχigt]1/χ, (3.6)
where 11−χ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution and ω is a share parameter.
By investing iipt units of output during period t, the household increases the capital stock kipt+1
according to the law of motion:
kipt+1 = η(
iipt
kipt
)kipt + (1− δ)kipt, (3.7)
where η(
iipt
kipt) determines the change in private capital stock (gross of depreciation) induced by
investment spending. This adjustment cost is introduced to avoid large capital movements across
borders following Baxter and Crucini (1993).1 We will assume that η′ > 0, and η′′ ≤ 0, with
η′(δ˜) = 1, and η(δ˜) = δ˜.2 This will guarantee that there are no adjustment costs in the steady
state. The aggregate public capital stock follows the law of motion:
kigt+1 = iigt + (1− δ)kigt, (3.8)
where δ is the depreciation rate for both private and public capital stocks.
Since both countries produce the same good, the world resource constraint is given by:
piyht + (1− pi)yft = pi(chpt + chgt + ihpt + ihgt)
+(1− pi)(cfpt + cfgt + ifpt + ifgt),
(3.9)
where we have assumed that TBh+TBf = 0, where TBi is the trade balance in country i, and where
pi is the fraction of agents living in the home country. Finally, I will also assume that government
1It is shown in Baxter and Crucini (1993) that without these transaction costs, investment turns out to be too
volatile compared to the data.
2δ˜ refers to δ + g, where g is the growth rate.
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purchases are entirely financed by lump-sum taxes:
cigt + iigt = Tit. (3.10)
3.4.3 Shocks
To maintain proper alignment with the data, stationarity is induced in the model by eliminating
trends. Specifically, cipt, iipt, kipt, cigt, iigt, and kigt are normalized by the common growth rate
given by g1−α , and all variables are expressed as deviations from steady states. The world economy
is subject to a 6 x 1 vector of shocks: zht, zft, chgt, cfgt, ihgt, and ifgt. The logs of the shocks will
be assumed to exhibit AR(1) fluctuations about a linear trend. Technology in the home country is
specified according to:
log(z˜ht) = (1− ρhz)log(z¯) + ρhzlog(z˜ht−1) + νlog(z˜ft−1) + zht, (3.11)
while technology in the foreign country is specified according to:
log(z˜ft) = (1− ρfz)log(z¯) + ρfzlog(z˜ft−1) + νlog(z˜ht−1) + zf t, (3.12)
where z¯ > 0, ρiz ∈ (−1, 1), and zit ∼ N(0, σ2zi).3 Under this specification, innovations to produc-
tivity in one country are permitted to spill to the other country, assuming the diffusion parameter ν
is non-zero. Additionally, technology shocks are allowed to be contemporaneously correlated across
the two countries: Corr(zht, zf t) = .
Government consumption and investment, cigt and iigt are assumed to follow these laws of
motion after detrending:
log(c˜igt) = (1− ρcig)log(c¯g) + ρcig log(c˜igt−1) + cigt, (3.13)
where ρcig ∈ (−1, 1) and cigt ∼ N(0, σ2cig);
log(˜iigt) = (1− ρiig)log(i¯g) + ρiig log(˜iigt−1) + iigt, (3.14)
where ρiig ∈ (−1, 1) and iigt ∼ N(0, σ2iig).
3Tildes represent detrended values, and bars denote steady states.
39
3.4.4 Model Solution
In this model, financial markets are complete and financial capital is freely mobile across countries:
agents in each country may buy contingent claims to insure against shocks. Since there is only
one consumption good, the only motive for trade here is to smooth consumption profiles. The
equilibrium allocations can be found by solving the world planner’s problem of maximizing U
subject to the constraints.
maxEt
( ∞∑
t=0
piβtu(Cht, lht) + (1− pi)βtu(Cft, lft)
)
,
where the social planner’s weights are set to be proportional to each country’s population size. In
addition to the intertemporal and intratemporal trade-off decisions for each country, there will be
an international risk-sharing condition wherein the social planner will allocate goods away from the
low marginal utility to the high marginal utility country:
pi
(
Cht+1
Cht
)γ(1−φ)−ψ (chpt+1
chpt
)ψ−1( lht+1
lht
)(1−γ)(1−ψ)
=
(1− pi)
(
Cft+1
Cft
)γ(1−φ)−ψ (cfpt+1
cfpt
)ψ−1( lft+1
lft
)(1−γ)(1−ψ)
The model does not have a closed-form solution. The system of equations is mapped into a linearized
system by taking a log-linear approximation around the steady states. The approximate solution
takes the form xt+1 = F (µ)xt + G(µ)νt+1, where νt+1 denotes the collection of structural shocks.
The model is then calibrated to compute international correlations to be compared with the data.
3.5 DATA AND EMPIRICAL REGULARITIES
The U.S. series are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis database (FRED). Hours worked
for the U.S. comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) Establishment Survey. Data for
the remaining countries on private consumption and investment, government consumption and
investment, and hours worked are from the OECD database. Hours worked data was only available
on an annual basis: I obtain quarterly data using interpolation. All series are quarterly, in chained
volume estimates according to national reference year, seasonally adjusted, and converted to US
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dollars using the PPP of the national reference year, and divided by working-age population.
Population is available from the WDI database on an annual basis: I obtain quarterly data using
interpolation. Saving is constructed as GDP minus private and public consumption. The data is
HP-filtered and selected country statistics are reported for deviations from trend in Table 3.1. The
countries considered are Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Korea, Norway, Switzerland, the UK,
and the US. Country selection was based on availability of recent long time-series data. The time
period considered for all the series is 1980:Q1 through 2008:Q1. The only exception for this time
sample is the data on hours worked. The most comprehensive data within the sample were used.
Hours worked data was available for all the countries in the sample except Japan.
Table 3.1: Standard Deviations Relative to Output (1980-2008)
Country Cp Cg I n
Australia 0.67 1.11 3.67 0.56
Canada 0.80 0.64 2.64 0.18
France 0.92 0.69 3.05 0.72
Japan 0.73 0.80 2.40 -
Korea 1.43 0.60 2.68 0.20
Norway 1.20 1.02 4.28 0.60
Switzerland 0.59 1.06 2.67 0.30
UK 1.19 0.81 3.42 0.29
US 0.78 0.89 4.19 1.23
The only series for private consumption that is consistently available across countries on a quar-
terly basis is that of total (durables and non-durables) consumption. Hence the general empirical
regularities reported below will be corresponding to total consumption including durables. This is
typically the measure used in the literature.
Table 3.2 reports individual correlations for 9 OECD countries, Table 3.3 reports pairwise
private consumption correlations, and Table 3.4 reports the same information for pairwise output
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correlations. These tables show interesting regularities that confirm previous findings. These
regularities are, by now, well documented in the literature but the statistics here confirm that these
puzzles still exist even using recent data. Table 3.2 confirms that investment-saving correlations
Corr(S, I) are high. It also confirms the finding in Feldstein (2005): the correlation between saving
and investment is lower for small countries than it is for larger ones (Norway and Korea in our
sample). Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show that private consumption correlations across the countries in the
sample are consistently lower than those of output.
Table 3.2: Domestic Correlations (1980-2008)
Country (Cp, Y ) (Cg, Y ) (I, Y ) (n, Y ) (S, I)
Australia 0.35 0.24 0.81 0.10 0.72
Canada 0.71 -0.28 0.99 0.54 0.62
France 0.76 -0.35 0.90 0.20 0.72
Japan 0.64 -0.06 0.82 - 0.73
Korea 0.83 0.08 0.82 0.69 0.21
Norway 0.53 -0.15 -0.03 0.23 -0.03
Switzerland 0.71 0.41 0.67 0.16 0.57
UK 0.85 -0.26 0.72 0.33 0.54
US 0.85 0.12 0.91 0.86 0.91
Finally, Table 3.5 compares the median found in our sample for relevant statistics to a data
range found in the literature. The differences in these statistics arise because of using different
countries or different time periods. Our cross-country correlations are all lower than those found
in the literature. This is because we use the most recent data available. In the literature, lower
correlations are typically found when using more recent samples. For example, the low estimates
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Table 3.3: Cross-Country Private Consumption Correlations (1980-2008)
Country Australia Canada France Japan Korea Norway Switzerland UK US
Australia 1.00 0.11 0.54 0.17 -0.12 -0.03 0.28 0.26 -0.001
Canada 1.00 0.01 -0.07 0.04 0.31 0.44 0.60 0.68
France 1.00 0.25 0.01 -0.13 0.53 0.37 0.02
Japan 1.00 0.40 -0.05 0.08 0.13 -0.08
Korea 1.00 0.06 -0.08 0.02 -0.08
Norway 1.00 0.11 -0.03 0.28
Switzerland 1.00 0.39 0.30
UK 1.00 0.53
US 1.00
Table 3.4: Cross-Country Output Correlations (1980-2008)
Country Australia Canada France Japan Korea Norway Switzerland UK US
Australia 1.00 0.73 0.07 0.07 -0.14 0.21 0.44 0.45 0.65
Canada 1.00 0.29 0.07 0.10 0.23 0.55 0.60 0.82
France 1.00 0.34 0.09 -0.13 0.61 0.43 0.19
Japan 1.00 0.23 0.15 0.38 0.03 0.12
Korea 1.00 0.14 -0.14 0.27 -0.02
Norway 1.00 0.23 0.10 0.40
Switzerland 1.00 0.28 0.52
UK 1.00 0.49
US 1.00
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correspond to the Kehoe and Perri (2002) sample covering data from 1970 to 1998, while the high
estimates correspond to Baxter and Farr (2005) which uses data from 1961 to 1991. Therefore, it
should not be surprising that our correlations are even lower than those of Kehoe and Perri (2002)
since our sample covers the period from 1980 through 2008. The median we found will be used
when comparing the model’s results to the data.
Table 3.5: Summary of Data Moments
Measure This papera Kehoe and Perri (2002) Baxter and Farr (2005)
(1980-2008) (1970-1998) (1961-1991)
Domestic
σc˜p/σy˜ 0.78 0.76 0.79
σi˜/σy˜ 4.73 2.98 3.27
σn˜/σy˜ 1.23 0.63 0.85
Corr(c˜p, y˜) 0.85 0.81 0.87
Corr(˜i, y˜) 0.89 0.81 0.93
Corr(n˜, y˜) 0.86 0.78 0.86
Corr(˜ih, s˜h) 0.91 0.68 0.94
US - Foreign Correlations
Corr(y˜h, y˜f ) 0.44 0.51 0.81
Corr(c˜hp, c˜fp) 0.15 0.32 0.67
Corr(˜ih, i˜f ) 0.25 0.29 0.73
Corr(n˜h, n˜f ) 0.37 0.43 0.75
aThis refers to US statistics in our sample for US Domestic, and to the median for cross-country correlations with
the US for international statistics.
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3.6 CALIBRATION
Before providing quantitative results regarding the international puzzles, and to provide intuition
behind the implications of the model’s dynamics, I first illustrate how different shocks carry al-
ternative implications for variables’ movements. While Baxter and Crucini (1993) consider only
cases where a shock takes place only in the home country, shocks to both countries are considered
here. The model is calibrated to a situation where two countries have the same stochastic driving
processes as the US and a small country. Since Canada is of size corresponding to the median size
in our sample, it will be used as the foreign country. Since US output in the data is about ten
times higher on average than a median country’s output in our sample, pi is set to 0.91 such that
the home country refers to the US.
Following the literature, the deep parameters of the model will be assumed identical in both
countries, while heterogeneity is allowed in the exogenous forces’ specifications. These parameters
are summarized in Table 3.6. The growth rate g, the private capital share parameter α, the
discount rate β, the depreciation rate δ, and the coefficient of relative risk aversion φ are set to
values comparable with studies in the literature (e.g. see Baxter and Crucini, 1993; BKK, 1992;
and Marrinan, 1999.) γ is chosen so that hours worked in the steady state is 1/3. As for the
elasticity of the investment-capital ratio to Tobin’s Q, ζ, I calibrate it as the same value used in
the benchmark specification of Baxter and Crucini (1993) and Baxter and Farr (2005).
In calibrating the autocorrelations and standard deviations of the government shocks, I run
OLS regressions based on the government consumption and investment series of each country
separately. As for the parameters of the productivity process, I follow the identification approach
used by Baxter and Crucini (1993) and Wen (2007). Specifically, these were chosen to generate
the persistence and autocorrelation of output observed in the data. Once government shocks are
added, these parameters are recalibrated so that the residuals can explain the remaining persistence
in output. Finally, c¯g/y¯ and i¯g/y¯ were restricted to match the means found in the data. These
parameters are summarized in Table 3.7.
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Table 3.6: Calibration: Deep Parameters
Parameter Value Description
α 0.33 Private capital share parameter
β 0.99 Discount factor
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate of private and public capital
φ 2 Coefficient of relative risk aversion
γ 0.28 Consumption’s share relative to leisure of utility
g 0.0052 Growth rate
ζ 15 Elasticity of I/K to Tobin’s Q
pi 0.91 Home country share
Table 3.7: Calibration: Exogenous Shocks
Parameter US Value Canada Value Description
ρz 0.84 0.85 Technology shock persistence parameter
σz 0.0055 0.0035 Standard Deviation of the technology shock
ρcg 0.77 0.69 Public consumption shock persistence parameter
σcg 0.0069 0.0072 Standard deviation of the public consumption shock
ρig 0.69 0.82 Public investment shock persistence parameter
σig 0.021 0.019 Standard deviation of the public investment shock
ν 0 0 Spillover of technology shocks
 0.258 0.258 Correlation of innovations to technology shocks
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The literature has not reached a consensus on whether there is transmission of shocks from
one country to another over time. While BKK (1992) estimate using Solow residuals that there is
evidence of cross-country spillovers of shocks to technology, and that innovations to productivity
are positively correlated across countries, Baxter and Crucini (1995) find that the transmission
parameters are not statistically significant. In our benchmark economy, ν is set to zero, and I
perform sensitivity analysis over this parameter later on.  is set to 0.258 which is a value agreed
upon in empirical studies.
In the benchmark specification of the model, I will assume that all the CES parameters are
equal to one. As I change the CES parameters from one, the parameter γ will be changed to ensure
that hours worked in the steady state remain one third.
3.7 MODEL MECHANISMS
3.7.1 A Technology Shock
Figure 3.1 shows impulse response functions to a 1% increase in technology in the home country
under the benchmark specification. The technology shock raises domestic output, consumption,
and investment at home due to a higher marginal product of private capital. This helps account
for the high investment-saving correlation found in the data (e.g. see Baxter and Crucini, 1993).
Investment is usually found to be very volatile in open economy models since it is easy to shift
resources from one country to another. This is circumvented in the model used here by adding
transaction costs to avoid large flows across borders. For example when ζ = 1000, an extreme
response of investment to international rate of return differentials is observed.4 Foreign investment
is then more than 5 times as volatile as output. If on the other hand, ζ = 1, the volatility of foreign
investment is less than one relative to output.
As for foreign variables, foreign output decreases since resources are switched to the more
productive location (the home country). In the literature, foreign investment typically decreases.
However, as shown in Baxter and Crucini (1993), as the persistence of the technology shock de-
creases, the incentive to move goods in response to the shock also decreases. Since the persistence
4An infinite ζ is equivalent to no transaction costs in the model.
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Figure 3.1: Impulse Response Functions to a 1% Increase in Home Technology
parameter for the US is found to be low here (0.84), foreign investment eventually increases. Hours
worked increase at home and decrease abroad. This happens because of a substitution effect of
leisure supported by risk-sharing and capital mobility. Even though foreign output decreases, for-
eign consumption rises. This is one aspect of how the benchmark economy differs from postwar
international data, referred to as the BKK puzzle. In the data presented here, most consumption
correlations across countries are less than 0.5, and a few are even negative. The model with tech-
nology shocks alone predicts an almost perfect correlation between the two countries’ consumption
profiles.
3.7.2 A Government Investment Shock
In this paper I argue that, similarly to a productivity shock, an increase in home government
investment causes a high correlation between investment and saving. But in order for this to
take effect, government investment has to be complementary with private investment. The CES
parameters are adopted from Mazraani (2010): ω is calibrated to 0.83 since the share of public
investment to gross investment is 17% in US data, and χ is estimated to be −0.38 meaning public
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and private capital are complements in the production function. Figure 3.2 shows impulse response
functions to a 1% increase in home government investment in such a case. The shock at home
raises output, and as the public capital stock builds up, it starts boosting private investment at
home. Hours, saving, and consumption also increase. The effect on the foreign country is similar
to the productivity shock’s effects: private investment moves to the more productive location, and
agents insure themselves which allows them to increase private consumption even though foreign
output decreases.
Figure 3.2: Impulse Response Functions to a 1% Increase in Home Government Investment: Com-
plements
To see why government investment shocks need to have complementary effects in the model
in order to help resolve the puzzle, an alternative version where government investment shocks
substitute private investment is depicted in Figure 3.3 (χ = 1). Under this scenario, not only does
the shock cause an income effect through the resource constraint, but the drop in private investment
at home is further amplified because of crowding-out. Agents in the two countries synchronize to
work more, and consume and invest less. In this case, investment and saving don’t move in the
same direction. This confirms the intuition behind using complementary government investment
shocks qualitatively. The next section provides quantitative moments’ results, as well as sensitivity
results to different values of χ.
49
Figure 3.3: Impulse Response Functions to a 1% Increase in Home Government Investment: Sub-
stitutes
3.7.3 A Government Consumption Shock
As with the technology shock, the resolution of the FH puzzle comes at the cost of high consumption
correlations which contradicts the data. Government consumption shocks are added to the model
as a result. The CES parameters are calibrated as follows: τ is calibrated to 0.83 and ψ is estimated
to be −4.86 implying that government consumption is a strong complement to private consumption
in the utility function. Figure 3.4 shows impulse response functions to a 1% increase in government
consumption using these assumptions.
Before explaining the dynamics of figure 3.4, it is worthwhile to examine the case when gov-
ernment consumption either doesn’t enter the utility function (Figure 3.5), or enters the utility
function and perfectly substitutes private consumption at home (Figure 3.6). When government
consumption does not affect private agents’ utility, it only has a wealth effect in the model. This
increases hours, output and makes private consumption fall at home. This effect is shared equally
by the foreign country. This can be better understood by examining the world resource constraint
(equation 3.9). From the point of view of the social planner, a government consumption shock at
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Figure 3.4: Impulse Response Functions to a 1% Increase in Home Government Consumption:
Complements
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home causes an income effect in the world economy. This is why consumption drops equally in the
foreign country.
Figure 3.5: Impulse Response Functions to a 1% Increase in Home Government Consumption: No
Effect on Utility
However, when government consumption perfectly substitutes private consumption (Figure 3.6),
the reduction in private consumption at home is compensated for by the increase in government
consumption at home, and home private consumption decreases more than before. The risk-sharing
condition imposed by the social planner implies that resources are shifted from the low marginal
utility country to the high marginal utility country. Since a government consumption shock that
acts as a substitute to private consumption decreases the marginal utility of consumption at home,
the foreign country does not share this effect equally with the home country. This helps break
some of the correlation in consumption across countries. In Marrinan (1999), these are the only
assumptions used for government consumption. With these assumptions, Marinnan does not get
far in explaining the low consumption correlations observed in the data. In this paper, I assume
that government consumption strongly complements private consumption such that it resembles
the preference shock of Wen (2007). This will imply even lower correlations of consumption across
countries.
In Figure 3.4, the government consumption shock at home increases labor supply at home
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Figure 3.6: Impulse Response Functions to a 1% Increase in Home Government Consumption:
Substitutes
due to the negative wealth effect. Owing to the high complementarity between government and
private consumption however, government consumption shocks raise the marginal utility of private
consumption at home. The social planner will then provide more resources to the home country
until marginal utilities are equated again. This helps account for the BKK puzzle since preference
shocks create a wedge between the two countries’ consumption profiles.
3.8 QUANTITATIVE RESULTS
Having illustrated the qualitative effects of how different shocks in the model help contribute
to the puzzles’ resolutions, I now turn to present the quantitative moments implied by different
specifications of the model. I consider five cases: a baseline situation with technology shocks alone
and all the CES parameters turned to one, a case where only government investment shocks are
present and the CES parameters of the government consumption shocks are one, a case where only
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government consumption shocks are present and the CES parameters of the government investment
shocks are one, a case where only government consumption and investment shocks are present, and
a case where all shocks take place simultaneously. The baseline situation is presented since our
model encompasses the case studied in the literature and to facilitate comparison.
3.8.1 The Baseline Situation
Table 3.8 compares data statistics to the model’s predictions. The second column of the table
shows results for the baseline case. The literature has well documented the behavior of several
variables using international data. Consumption is typically found to be less volatile than output,
while investment is about 3 to 4 times more volatile than output. Consumption, investment, and
hours worked are procyclical. Investment and saving are highly correlated. Output, investment,
consumption, and hours worked are all positively correlated across countries.
The baseline situation assumes only technology shocks are present. It is well known that a neo-
classical two-country model with technology shocks generates negative cross-country correlations
of output, investment, and hours worked, which is at odds with the data (e.g. see BKK, 1992.) It
also generates an almost perfect correlation of consumption across countries. However, it correctly
predicts that investment and saving are positively correlated domestically. While the correlation
between investment and saving is 0.99 accounting for the FH puzzle, the cross-country consump-
tion correlation is also 0.96 hurting the model’s ability to account for the BKK puzzle. Another
shortcoming of technology shocks in two-country models is that they hurt the model’s ability to
account for other moments of the data. For example, it incorrectly predicts that output and hours
worked are negatively correlated.
So far, we have assumed that ν = 0, meaning technology doesn’t spill across countries. We
perform a sensitivity analysis over the value of ν. This is illustrated in Table 3.9. We get similar
results to Baxter and Crucini (1993): Changing ν has minor effects. The most notable change
is that the output correlations across countries become more reasonable, and that the relative
volatility of consumption to output increases, while that of investment decreases.
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Table 3.8: Model Results
Measure Data z shocks ig shocks cg shocks cg & ig shocks
Domestic
σc˜p/σy˜ 0.78 0.70 0.77 0.99 0.91
σi˜/σy˜ 4.73 2.58 3.01 0.78 1.15
σn˜/σy˜ 1.23 0.30 0.41 1.33 1.46
Corr(c˜p, y˜) 0.85 0.92 0.81 0.99 0.99
Corr(˜i, y˜) 0.89 0.96 0.55 0.99 0.91
Corr(n˜, y˜) 0.86 0.79 0.64 0.99 0.99
Corr(˜ih, s˜h) 0.91 0.99 0.94 0.99 0.97
US - Foreign Correlations
Corr(y˜h, y˜f ) 0.44 -0.34 -0.40 -0.08 -0.11
Corr(c˜hp, c˜fp) 0.15 0.96 0.79 -0.01 0.02
Corr(˜ih, i˜f ) 0.25 0.36 0.20 -0.64 -0.21
Corr(n˜h, n˜f ) 0.37 -0.45 -0.35 -0.05 -0.07
The predicted statistics are based on 10,000 simulations with sample length 100.
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Table 3.9: Sensitivity Analysis: Technology Spillover (ν)
Measure Data (ν = 0) (ν = 0.04)
z shocks z shocks
Domestic
σc˜p/σy˜ 0.78 0.70 0.75
σi˜p/σy˜ 4.73 2.58 2.52
σn˜/σy˜ 1.23 0.30 0.29
Corr(c˜p, y˜) 0.85 0.92 0.92
Corr(˜ip, y˜) 0.89 0.96 0.96
Corr(n˜, y˜) 0.86 0.79 0.72
Corr(˜ih, s˜h) 0.91 0.99 0.99
US - Foreign Correlations
Corr(y˜h, y˜f ) 0.44 -0.34 -0.04
Corr(c˜hp, c˜fp) 0.15 0.96 0.97
Corr(˜ih, i˜f ) 0.25 0.36 0.65
Corr(n˜h, n˜f ) 0.37 -0.45 -0.44
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3.8.2 Government Investment Shocks
The hypothesis in this paper is that government investment shocks can perform as well as technology
shocks in a two-country neoclassical model. Table 3.8 (third column) reports the moments for
χ = −0.38: Quantitative results confirm our initial intuition.
A model driven by government investment shocks alone predicts very similar moments to the
model with technology shocks alone. It replicates the standard deviations of consumption and
investment, and their correlations with output fairly well. It can also help account for the FH
puzzle: Corr(˜ih, s˜h) is found to be 0.94, which is similar to the moment predicted by technology
shocks (0.99). The success of these shocks in matching cross-country correlations, however, is
mixed. While the model correctly predicts that investment correlations are positive across countries,
it predicts that output and hours worked are negatively correlated, while consumption is highly
correlated. The intuition behind this result is similar to the technology shock’s case: due to a shock
in the home country, agents in the foreign country will find it more productive to channel their
resources towards the home country. Investment, saving, and hours worked go up at home, while
they decrease in the foreign country. This explains the high saving-investment correlation. Since
investment shocks do not enter agents’ utility, the risk-sharing condition implies that the planner
will equate consumptions of the two countries. I show in the next subsection that government
consumption shocks help circumvent this problem since they enter the utility function.
Government investment shocks also perform poorly with respect to the standard deviation
of hours worked. Technology shocks predict the moment to be 0.30, while investment shocks
predict it to be 0.41. This is far off from the moment found in the data of 1.23. It is well-known
that a prototypical RBC model cannot account for labor market behavior (e.g., see Christiano
and Eichenbaum, 1992; and Hansen and Wright, 1992). Since both government investment and
technology shocks work through the supply dimension, they cannot help account for the behavior
of hours worked in the data. I show in the next subsection that government consumption shocks
working through the demand dimension can help with hours worked, as well as with cross-country
consumption correlations.
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3.8.3 Government Consumption Shocks
While Wen (2007) and Stockman and Tesar (1995) use preference or taste shocks in the utility func-
tion to explain the BKK puzzle, a limitation of their approach is that the shocks are unobservable.
In their setting, it is assumed that these shocks follow random walk processes and their standard
deviation is calibrated such that it matches that of output. It is also shown that the shocks have
to be extremely persistent (σ = 0.025) in order to help account for the puzzle. In this paper, the
attempt is to see whether government consumption shocks acting as “keynesian preference” shocks
can be used as a proxy for the unobservable shocks and quantitatively resolve the puzzle.
In table 3.8 (column 4), it is shown that the model with government consumption shocks
alone matches the volatility of hours worked better than the model with technology shocks. This
is because the main channel through which government consumption shocks transmit is through
hours worked. Due to these shocks that raise the marginal utility of private consumption at home,
agents need to work harder in order to achieve the desired increase in consumption. For higher
values of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, agents desire a more smooth consumption profile,
and private investment can also increase. These effects cause home consumption, investment, and
hours to be procyclical with output, which is what we find in the data. It is interesting to note
that the volatility of private investment relative to output is predicted to be lower than found in
the data. This is because we use transaction costs in the model which decrease the volatility of
investment.
As for the puzzles, it is shown that the model with government consumption shocks performs
better in matching other moments of the data and in helping account for the BKK and the FH puzzle
simultaneously. The cross-country consumption correlation is found to be low (-0.01 compared to a
median value of 0.15). The intuition behind this result is straightforward: As the marginal utility
of consumption increases at home, the social planner shifts resources from the foreign country until
marginal utilities are equated. This causes the consumption profiles to be less synchronized across
countries (Figure 3.4). While technology shocks alone predict an extreme negative correlation
between output and hours worked across countries, government consumption shocks get closer to
these moments. Finally, government consumption shocks alone similarly help bring investment-
saving correlations closer to the data. As explained earlier, investment is procyclical with output;
both saving and investment increase as a result.
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3.8.4 Government Consumption and Investment Shocks
Next, we ask whether a model with government consumption and investment shocks combined can
help account for the data better than a model with technology shocks alone. The results for this
exercise are presented in the last column of Table 3.8. It is shown that a model with government
consumption and investment shocks alone can do better than one with technology shocks in helping
account for the FH and BKK puzzle simultaneously. The investment-saving correlation is found to
be 0.97 which is close to the US value of 0.91. Further, the cross-country consumption correlation
is found to be 0.02 which is also close to our median of 0.15. While the model we propose does
not correctly predict the sign of the cross country correlations in output, hours, and investment, it
performs better than technology shocks in matching those moments. The model also underpredicts
the volatility of investment to output: Since we have included transaction costs in the model, this
makes it costly to adjust capital.
3.8.5 Sensitivity Analysis
We check whether different values of χ and ψ have different implications for the puzzles. In Table
3.10, we compare the moments for different values of χ and ψ. The second column of the table
represents the baseline situation; the third considers the complements case; and the last considers a
substitutes case. As discussed earlier using impulse response functions, the substitutes’ case cannot
help account for the two puzzles simultaneously. Quantitative results reported in the last column
confirm this intuition. While the model correctly predicts a high correlation between investment and
saving, note that consumption and investment are now countercyclical. This is because investment
decreases in the substitutes case. While saving increases due to investment shocks (see Figure 3.3),
it decreases due to a consumption shock in the substitutes case (see Figure 3.6). Investment and
saving both go down causing the high correlation as a result. For a lower ψ of 0.5, cross-country
consumption correlations are very high (0.74), which is at odds with the data.
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Table 3.10: Sensitivity Analysis: CES Parameters (ψ and χ)
Measure Data Complements Substitutes
ψ = −4.86, χ = −0.38 ψ = 0.5.χ = 0.5
z shocks cg & ig shocks cg & ig shocks
Domestic
σc˜p/σy˜ 0.78 0.70 0.91 3.22
σi˜/σy˜ 4.73 2.58 1.15 9.58
σn˜/σy˜ 1.23 0.30 1.46 1.70
Corr(c˜p, y˜) 0.85 0.92 0.99 -0.69
Corr(˜i, y˜) 0.89 0.96 0.91 -0.89
Corr(n˜, y˜) 0.86 0.79 0.99 0.78
Corr(˜ih, s˜h) 0.91 0.99 0.97 0.98
US - Foreign Correlations
Corr(y˜h, y˜f ) 0.44 -0.34 -0.11 0.51
Corr(c˜hp, c˜fp) 0.15 0.96 0.02 0.74
Corr(˜ih, i˜f ) 0.25 0.36 -0.21 0.99
Corr(n˜h, n˜f ) 0.37 -0.45 -0.07 0.89
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3.8.6 All Shocks
Since technology shocks and government spending shocks predict opposing results for some data
moments, it is likely that the data lies somewhere in between their predictions: we now examine the
implications of adding the three shocks simultaneously. We still expect the puzzles to be resolved
in this case since private activity is unsynchronized across countries even if shocks take place in
both of them. Table 3.11 reports these results for the complements case. When adding technology
shocks with government expenditure shocks, the contribution of technology shocks to the volatility
of output changes. Government expenditure shocks contribute 61% to the variability of output in
the US (65% in Canada), and technology shocks explain the remaining variability (39%). Note
that in the setting of Wen (2007), technology shocks are only allowed to contribute 1% to the
total variability in output since the preference shocks are of much higher magnitude than in our
setting. Since government expenditure shocks have an amplification effect in our model, they can
still resolve the puzzles quantitatively even with lower magnitude.
It is shown that the model augmented with government spending shocks (column 4) improves
the performance of the model with technology shocks alone (column 2) along several dimensions.
First, it helps reduce the cross-country consumption correlation (from 0.96 to 0.13), which helps
account for the BKK puzzle. Second, it helps account for the FH puzzle: the investment-saving
correlation is 0.99 compared to a value of 0.91 found in the data. Third, the model’s prediction
for the volatility of hours worked improves (from 0.29 to 1.07). While the model augmented
with government shocks does not correctly predict the sign of output cross-country correlations, it
correctly predicts the sign of the cross-country investment correlation, and improves the model’s
ability to match the cross-country correlation in hours worked.
3.8.7 External Empirical Validity
In this chapter, government consumption shocks are used as a proxy for taste or demand shocks,
and government investment shocks are a proxy for a share of the productivity disturbances. I
perform an exercise using the Kalman Filter to get external empirical validity for the model by
comparing the model’s inferred behavior to the actual government data series. Specifically, any
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Table 3.11: Model Results: All Shocks
Measure Data Complements Complements
ψ = −4.86, χ = −0.38 ψ = −4.86, χ = −0.38
z shocks cg & ig shocks All shocks
Domestic
σc˜p/σy˜ 0.78 0.70 0.91 0.64
σi˜p/σy˜ 4.73 2.58 1.15 3.55
σn˜/σy˜ 1.23 0.30 1.46 1.07
Corr(c˜p, y˜) 0.85 0.92 0.99 0.84
Corr(˜ip, y˜) 0.89 0.96 0.91 0.85
Corr(n˜, y˜) 0.86 0.79 0.99 0.45
Corr(˜ih, s˜h) 0.91 0.99 0.97 0.99
US - Foreign Correlations
Corr(y˜h, y˜f ) 0.44 -0.34 -0.11 -0.53
Corr(c˜hp, c˜fp) 0.15 0.96 0.02 0.13
Corr(˜ih, i˜f ) 0.25 0.36 -0.21 0.63
Corr(n˜h, n˜f ) 0.37 -0.45 -0.07 0.24
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observable variables can be recovered from the data using the smoothing algorithm built into the
Kalman Filter. Given the observable data on private consumption, investment, and hours worked,
the unobservables for the government consumption and investment series are recovered. Table 3.12
shows the time-series in differences for the two pairs. The correlations between the unobservables
and the government series are found to be positive (0.22 and 0.17 for government consumption,
and investment, respectively.) Overall, this indicates positive empirical evidence that these shocks
represent a portion of these disturbances.
Figure 3.7: Smoothed Unobservable Series (Solid) and Actual HP-Filtered Data (Dashed)
3.9 CONCLUSION
This paper presents evidence that the FH and BKK puzzles still exist using very recent data.
We construct a two-country, one good version of the neoclassical model and study the effects of
government shocks in that setting. We show that government investment shocks alone in the model
can help account for the FH puzzle quantitatively. This is achieved despite the fact that capital is
assumed mobile across countries. We also show that government consumption shocks interpreted
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as preference shocks which complement private consumption in the utility function help resolve
the BKK puzzle. A model with government consumption and investment shocks combined can
simultaneously explain the FH and BKK puzzle, and improves the performance of the model with
technology shocks alone along several dimensions.
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4.0 ASSESSING FISCAL STRESS (CO-AUTHORED WITH EMANUELE
BALDACCI, IVA PETROVA, NAZIM BELHOCINE, AND GABRIELA
DOBRESCU)
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Recent fiscal difficulties around the world brought to the fore the importance of assessing fiscal
sustainability risks both in advanced and emerging economies. Based on the conceptual framework
presented in Cottarelli (2011), these risks can lead to a sovereign debt rollover crisis in the absence
of fiscal adjustment. Various factors can impact these fiscal sustainability risks, including: (i)
whether current and projected fiscal policies are consistent with solvency and liquidity requirements
(Baldacci, McHugh and Petrova, 2011); (ii) whether uncertainty around this baseline-reflecting
shocks to macroeconomic assumptions, fiscal policy, and contingent liabilities-has heightened; and
(iii) whether non fiscal factors (such as current account imbalances) and global financial market
risk appetite have increased the likelihood of a fiscal crisis (IMF, 2011).
In this paper, we build a new index of fiscal stress that provides early warning signals of fiscal
sustainability problems for advanced and emerging economies. Unlike previous studies, the analysis
is not confined to sovereign debt default or near-default events. Fiscal crisis periods are defined
as episodes of outright fiscal distress-public debt default/restructuring, need to access large-scale
official/IMF support, hyperinflation-as well as extreme financing problems-spikes in sovereign bond
spreads. In these cases, fiscal solvency is endangered and the government is forced to alter its
policies to regain fiscal sustainability.
Another innovation of this paper is that the fiscal stress index is based on a set of indicators
that measure the risk of fiscal sustainability based on current fiscal variables and their baseline
projections using a consistent conceptual framework (Baldacci, McHugh and Petrova, 2011). For
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each indicator, thresholds are estimated on the basis of a univariate procedure that maximizes the
likelihood of predicting a fiscal crisis. The fiscal stress index measures the number of indicators
exceeding these thresholds, weighted by their relative signaling power. The index can be used to
assess the degree of fiscal stress in advanced and emerging market economies over time. Results
show that fiscal stress risks remain elevated in advanced economies and well above the pre-crisis
years. This owes to high solvency risks related to fiscal fundamentals and aging-related long-term
budget pressures as well as record-high budget financing needs. Fiscal stress is lower for emerging
economies, due to the rebuilding of fiscal buffers and more positive growth prospects than in mature
economies. However, risks remain higher than in pre-crisis years also for these economies and point
to continued vulnerabilities to shocks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section surveys the literature on early
warning systems, focusing on studies of fiscal crises. Section 4.3 elaborates the early warning
methodology applied to developing the fiscal stress index. Section 4.4 describes the data used and
main results, and Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW
There is an abundant literature on Early Warning System (EWS) models, mostly focused on cur-
rency and banking crises. These empirical studies differ according to: (i) the definition of crisis
events; (ii) the methodology adopted; and (iii) the set of indicators used. Also country coverage
tends to be limited by data quality, with only a few studies focusing on both advanced and emerging
economies (and even in these cases limiting the analysis to relatively small samples).
Previous studies typically focused on financial crises, with a few papers assessing the risk of
public debt default. In the latter studies, the definition of crisis events typically covers only tail
events: for example, Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001) define public debt crises as events of
outright default or rescheduling, while Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelpfennig (2003) further add
the provision of a large-scale official financing support to the definition of fiscal crises. However,
extreme rollover problems are more common than public debt default episodes across advanced and
emerging economies in the last decades. A broader definition of fiscal crises could provide better
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information about changes in underlying fiscal sustainability risks, even in the absence of outright
debt default (or near-default events triggering financial support of the official sector). In this paper,
we define fiscal stress events to capture crisis episodes that encompass public debt default and near-
default events, as well as severe deteriorations in the fiscal solvency risk outlook leading to fiscal
sustainability risks (Cottarelli, 2011; IMF, 2011).
The empirical literature also differs with respect to the methodology used in the studies. Two
approaches are common: the univariate “signaling” approach and the multivariate regression anal-
ysis of the crisis determinants.1 The “signaling” approach was proposed in a seminal paper by
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) on determinants of currency crises. It entails using each
potential indicator of crisis events separately, identifying critical thresholds that signal such events
with the lowest prediction error, and then averaging the number of indicators exceeding this thresh-
old into a composite index. This is based on weights proportional to the signaling power of each
indicator. The methodology has been used in subsequent empirical studies, including to assess fiscal
vulnerability indicators that help predict financial crises in emerging economies (Hemming, Kell
and Schimmelpfennig, 2003) and to assess the risk of sudden stops (IMF, 2007). The multivariate
regression approach uses panel regressions (probit or logit) with a binary dependent variable equal
to one if a crisis occurs and zero otherwise. The impact of a set of determinants on the crisis
probability is then derived by estimating the model and testing the coefficients’ significance. Berg
and Patillo (1999) use this approach to predict currency crises and find that the crisis probability
increases with changes in the predictive indicators.
Various studies have attempted to compare the performance of these two methods based on
their success in correctly predicting crises. Berg and Patillo (1999) and Berg, Borensztein and
Patillo (2005) find that the multivariate probit model outperforms the “signaling” approach both
in-sample and in cross-country predictions, while the “signaling” approach has a better out-of-
sample performance. Overall, no approach emerges as the clear winner and results depend on the
type of crisis risk assessed.
In this paper, the “signaling” approach is used.2 This framework is relatively simple and al-
lows for a transparent mapping from a large set of fiscal indicators into a composite index of fiscal
1See Abiad (2003) for a survey, including other methodologies. Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelpfennig (2003)
also use a non-parametric method based on binary recursive tree analysis to assess nonlinear combinations of factors
affecting the likelihood of debt crises.
2This is consistent with the method adopted by the IMF in the Early Warning Exercise (IMF, 2010a).
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stress. Another advantage of the methodology is that it easily accommodates differences in data
availability across variables, while using panel multivariate regression models would limit the num-
ber of predictive variables owing to data gaps.3 One limitation of this approach is that individual
predictive variables cannot be tested for their conditional statistical significance. However, each
variable contributes to the fiscal stress index with a weight proportional to its power in predicting
a fiscal stress event.
The literature suggests several indicators that can help predict which countries are most vul-
nerable to banking crises. Frankel and Saravelos (2010) point to the importance of the level of
international reserves, the real exchange rate and the current account in predicting financial crises.
Similarly, IMF (2007) finds that external sector variables are important, in particular reserve cov-
erage, the current account and external debt relative to exports.
Only a few studies focus on fiscal variables determinant of fiscal crises. While fiscal data are not
as widely available as monetary or financial data, fiscal variables are also found to be relatively less
powerful in predicting crises.4 Hemming and Petrie (2002) discuss fiscal vulnerability and potential
fiscal indicators that might increase fiscal risks and Hemming, Hell and Schimmelpfennig (2003)
use a large set of fiscal variables for 29 emerging economies over the period 1970-2000 to assess
risks of currency, debt and banking crises. They find that the best fiscal indicators are short-term
public debt, foreign-currency debt as well as other deficit measures.
In this paper, we rely on a parsimonious set of fiscal indicators that have been identified by
Baldacci, McHugh and Petrova (2011) to measure fiscal sustainability risks under the medium-term
scenario of the World Economic Outlook baseline projections. These indicators measure solvency
risks based on current deficit and debt levels, and projected growth-adjusted interest rate on public
debt. Indicators of long-term budget pressure associated with demographic aging, such as projected
change in health care and pension expenditures, are also included. In addition to the solvency risk
outlook, the framework also covers risks to fiscal sustainability stemming from sovereign asset and
liability composition and financing requirements.
3Data limitations and low degrees of freedom may limit the use of the multivariate approach in particular when
the number of variables predicting a crisis is large.
4For example, Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelpfennig (2003) find that no fiscal variables are significant deter-
minants of debt crises using a panel logit model in a sample of advanced and emerging economies. They find that
the ratio of public debt to revenue is a better determinant of default risks when using a non-parametric method.
Nonetheless, high values of these indicators are associated with sovereign debt crises in their findings only when other
macroeconomic fundamentals are also weak.
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4.3 METHODOLOGY
4.3.1 Fiscal Crisis Episodes
A fiscal crisis episode is identified in this study as a period of extreme government funding difficulties
(Cottarelli, 2011). Funding pressures could arise as a result of public debt build-up, contingent
liabilities that become outright fiscal costs, negative revenue shocks, or unaddressed demographic-
related spending pressures. Financing constraints may also tighten due to market perception that
the composition of public debt impedes the repayment capacity of the government. The surveyed
literature suggests four types of criteria to capture such events: (i) debt default or restructuring;
(ii) implicit default; (iii) recourse to exceptional official financing; and (iv) a sharp deterioration in
market access.
Previous studies used a combination of the first three criteria to identify fiscal crises: public debt
default or restructuring, hyperinflation, and large-scale IMF-supported programs. A limitation of
this approach is that it misses fiscal distress episodes that are severe enough to alter the attainment
of macroeconomic stability and growth but do not result in defaults or near-defaults. Fiscal crises
can manifest themselves differently since the mid-1990s, with the development of bond markets and
a lower reliance of countries on bank loans (see Pescatori and Sy, 2007). Notably, some episodes
of severe difficulties may not trigger a debt default or restructuring and would not be captured by
the standard definition used in the literature.
This paper combines the criteria above with indicators of severe spikes in financing costs to ob-
tain a more comprehensive set of fiscal crisis events. To identify periods of public debt default, debt
restructuring, and high levels of IMF financing support, the same definition is used for advanced
and emerging economies. The definition of default follows Standard and Poor’s, which classifies
a sovereign in default if it is not current on its debt obligations (including exchange offers, debt
equity swaps, and buybacks for cash). Restructuring and rescheduling are defined as any operation
which alters the original terms of the debt-creditor contract. Public debt defaults include both
commercial and official creditors. Large IMF-supported programs are those with access above 100
percent of quota.5 These are typically non-concessional loans and are provided as part of an ad-
5Starting in 2009, many high-access programs have exceeded this threshold. Changing the threshold for high-access
programs does not alter the number of fiscal distress events significantly. Excluding precautionary arrangements from
the definition does not change the results significantly, either.
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justment program. Exceptional financing covers situations where near-default was avoided through
large-scale IMF-supported programs.6
Implicit domestic public debt defaults are identified by criteria for high inflation, differentiated
between advanced and emerging economies. High inflation episodes are those where the inflation
rate was above 35 percent per year in the case of advanced economies, and 500 percent per year
for emerging economies.7 The threshold for advanced economies was chosen on the basis of the
average haircut on public debt in case of external debt restructuring. This follows Sturzenegger et
al. (2006) and aims to capture implicit domestic defaults. The threshold for emerging economies
is based on results by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010).8
Severe government bond yield pressures are also considered. This captures situations in which
the government faces significant short-term market financing constraints.9 Periods when yield
spreads exceeded two standard deviations above the country-specific mean were used to capture
market financing pressure events for both advanced and emerging economies. In addition, for
emerging economies periods were also included when the bond yield spreads exceeded 1,000 basis
points (even if this level did not exceed two standard deviations from the mean) to capture countries
that have exceptionally high credit risk spreads for long periods, reflecting high political risks and
the consequences of past debt defaults (Pescatori and Sy, 2007).10
The resulting definition of fiscal distress events for advanced and emerging economies is pre-
sented in Table 4.1. Annual data for 29 advanced economies and 52 emerging economies covering
1970-2010 are used to identify fiscal stress events.11 Data on debt default and restructuring were
obtained from Standard and Poor. Information about exceptional IMF-supported programs is
6While a large set of distress events enhances the statistical robustness of the analysis, it could also weaken the
predictive capacity of the model. Results for the sensitivity analysis of fiscal distress events to changes in the definition
used in the text confirm that lowering the thresholds for identifying crisis episodes worsens the predictive ability of
the model, in particular for emerging economies.
7Sensitivity analysis was performed for alternative inflation rates. An inflation rate which exceeds 100 percent in
the case of emerging economies does not significantly affect the results.
8These authors prefer this benchmark to Cagan’s traditional definition of 50 percent inflation rate per month,
because it allows for the use of annual data which are more widely available.
9We separate periods of fiscal pressure into distinct events by assuming that there should be at least two years of
no fiscal distress between separate events. In addition, only the start year of the event is considered as the actual
fiscal distress year.
10This threshold is not binding in the case of advanced economies, due to their traditionally lower sovereign bond
spreads.
11The advanced economies in the sample are those covered by the IMF’s Fiscal Monitor. The emerging economies
are those covered in the Vulnerability Exercise for Emerging Market Economies (VEE) conducted by the IMF (2010).
It should be noted that some countries have moved over time from emerging economy to advanced country status.
In the paper, we classify these countries on the basis of the group they belong to in 2010.
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based on the IMF’s Finance Department database. Long-term domestic bond spreads and, where
available, 5-year credit default swap (CDS) spreads are used to capture sovereign yield spikes in
advanced economies. Data on spreads of long-term domestic bond spreads relative to comparable
U.S. bonds are used for emerging economies. Sourced of data on sovereign bond yields at annual
and monthly frequencies include the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS), Bloomberg,
and Datastream.
Table 4.1: Definition of Fiscal Crisis across Advanced and Emerging Market Economies
Event Criteria Advanced Economies Emerging Economies
Public debt default failure to service debt as S&P definition S&P definition
or restructuring payments come due, as well
as distressed debt exchanges
Large financing large IMF-supported program access to 100 percent access to 100 percent
quota or more quota or more
Implicit/Internal high inflation rate inflation greater than inflation greater than
Public debt default 35 percent per annum 500 percent per annum
Extreme financing sovereign yield pressure sovereign spreads greater sovereign spreads greater
constraint of the sovereign than 1,000 basis points or than 1,000 basis points or
2 s.d. from country average 2 s.d. from country average
On the basis of the definition used in the paper, there were 41 fiscal distress events in advanced
economies and 135 events in emerging economies (Table 4.2). Advanced countries’ events were
identified mainly by government bond yield spikes, with only a few countries experiencing episodes
of access to exceptional financing. Five countries experienced high-inflation events in the period;
only 7 out of 29 countries had no crises. In contrast, fiscal stress events for emerging economies
frequently involved multiple types of crises. About 60 percent of the cases relate to IMF-supported
programs (79 events) and a third to outright defaults and restructuring (each 52 events). However,
in the last decade fiscal stress events were increasingly identified through severe bond yield spikes
in these economies.
The incidence of new fiscal stress events is clustered around specific periods (Figure 4.1). Prior
to the recent financial crisis, several advanced economies experienced fiscal stress as a result of the
oil boom of 1973 and the recession of the early 1990s. Many countries entered into fiscal distress
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Table 4.2: Summary of Events across Advanced and Emerging Economies
Start of Crisis Fiscal Default or IMF- High Bond Yield Duration of
Stress Restructuring Supported Inflation Pressure Fiscal Stress
Events Program (in years)
Advanced Economies 41 0 6 5 29 2.5
1970-79 14 0 1 4 7 2.6
1980-89 8 0 2 1 5 2.5
1990-99 8 0 2 0 6 2.3
2000-10 11 0 1 0 11 2.6
Emerging Economies 135 52 79 6 15 3.6
1970-79 15 8 9 1 0 3.1
1980-89 41 26 22 0 0 6.6
1990-99 37 12 20 5 5 2.6
2000-10 42 6 28 0 10 1.6
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after the onset of the recent crisis in 2008, with a few more new crises occurring in 2009-10. Among
emerging economies, fiscal stress events were clustered around the public debt crises in the early
1980s, the Latin American and Asian crises of the 1990s, and the recent global financial crisis.
Figure 4.1: Incidence of Fiscal Crises
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics; Bloomberg; Standard and Poor’s; and Authors’ calculations.
The length of fiscal stress is on average 2 and a half years in advanced economies, and 3 and a
half years in emerging economies. As a result the incidence of fiscal crises may not correspond to
the number of countries which experience fiscal stress in any given year (Figure 4.2). Therefore,
in discussing the results we present the number of countries in fiscal stress in parallel with the
incidence of fiscal crisis events.
As expected, our approach identifies more crisis events than other studies (Table 4.3). This
stems from a more comprehensive definition of crisis events and from the larger sample used. The
differences in the events identified in the paper and those identified by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010)
arise mainly from the use of access to large IMF-supported programs and of government yield
spikes. Lastly, the timing of crises also differs occasionally from other datasets, either because of
the differences in definitions or because of the window required between two separate events.
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Figure 4.2: Countries in Fiscal Stress
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics; Bloomberg; Standard and Poor’s; and Authors’ calculations.
Table 4.3: Summary Comparison of Events across Studies
Fiscal Stress Index IMF EWS RR HKS MRS LV
Number of Eventsa 176 28 48 16 32 22
Number of Common Events 20 30 13 33 33
Number of Countries 81 48 66 29 47 102
aEvents dated differently by only one year are considered common events. Events within our identified crisis
durations are also considered common. IMF EWS refers to IMF (2007), RR to Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), HKS
to Hemming, Kell and Schimmelpfenning (2003), MRS to Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelpfenning (2003), LV to
Laeven and Valencia (2008). The number of total events and missed events in other studies do not add to 164 due
to differences in the sample of countries and dates covered.
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4.3.2 Fiscal Stress Thresholds
Indicator selection is based on the conceptual framework presented in Cottarelli (2011) and Bal-
dacci, McHgh and Petrova (2011). The indicators are divided into three groups that can indicate
risk over the short run, medium run, and long run. These are the basic fiscal variables, long-term
fiscal trends, and asset and liability management. Basic fiscal variables indicate risks of govern-
ment solvency: If the net present value of the future stream of primary fiscal balances is larger than
the initial stock of public debt, the intertemporal budget constraint will be violated. The second
dimension of risk refers to the medium run. If financing requirements are large, the risk that fiscal
solvency concerns will lead to a rollover crisis is high. The composition of the government’s assets
and liabilities may then amplify financing risks. Finally, fiscal solvency also depends on the extent
to which long-term demographic and economic trends will put pressure on the budget. This is
captured under the “long-term fiscal trends” group.
The estimation of fiscal stress thresholds for each indicator is based on the “signaling” approach
(IMF, 2007; IMF, 2010). This consists of defining cut-off values for each fiscal indicator that
discriminates between predicted crisis and non-crisis periods. To illustrate these methodologies,
the true versus predicted occurrence of crises are reported in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: True Versus Predicted Occurence of Crises
State of the World
Crisis No Crisis
Signal (crisis) True Positive (TP ) False Positive (FP )
Predicted result No signal (no crisis) False Negative (FN) True Negative (TN)
Total Total crises obs. NC Total non-crises obs. NNC
The table shows the occurrence of type II errors (FN(C)) and type I errors (FP (C)). The
objective is to find the optimal cut-off point C∗ for each indicator such that the occurrence of type
I and type II errors is minimized. Formally one can define an indicator variable at time t, for each
indicator i, dit, for the following j time periods as following:
dit =
 1 ∀j, if it−1 > Ci0, otherwise (4.1)
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where it refers to a fiscal indicator and is a monotonically increasing function of crises probabilities
and Ci represents a fixed cut-off for it.
12 As mentioned, the signaling window j is set to one year
in the analysis.
Two methods are commonly used in the literature to determine the optimal value of C: the
minimization of the total misclassified errors and the maximization of the signal-to-noise ratio.
Under the total misclassified errors (TME) method, for each cut-off point Ci, the TME value for
each indicator can be expressed as the sum of type I and type II errors,
TME(Ci) =
FN(Ci)
NCi
+
FP (Ci)
NNCi
. (4.2)
The optimal threshold C∗i for each indicator is the value that minimizes TME(Ci). Due to the
small number of fiscal crisis events relative to non-crisis periods, the TME methodology places
greater weight on misclassifying fiscal crisis events, thereby yielding relatively conservative thresh-
olds compared to other methods. The signal-to-noise (SNR) ratio can be defined as the ratio
of the percentage of correctly classified crises observations (1-type II errors) to the percentage of
incorrectly classified non-crises observations (type I errors). For each cut-off point Ci, the SNR
can be expressed as:
SNR(Ci) =
TP (Ci)/NCi
FP (Ci)/NNCi
. (4.3)
The optimal threshold C∗i under this approach is the value that maximizes SNR(Ci).
If an indicator exceeds the cut-off level, the model issues a signal of an upcoming fiscal distress
episode. The optimal cut-off point should balance the two types of statistical errors. The lower the
threshold, the more signals the model will send (i.e., type II errors will decrease), but at the same
time, the number of wrong signals rises (i.e., type I errors will increase). Using a higher threshold
reduces the number of wrong signals, but at the expense of increasing the number of missed distress
episodes.
12A fiscal indicator that crosses the optimal threshold in period t-1 signals a fiscal crisis in period t, thus implying
that the level of fiscal stress in the current period is determined by the values of the fiscal indicators in the previous
period.
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4.3.3 Fiscal Stress Index
A fiscal stress index is calculated based on the signaling power of each fiscal indicator. This entails
two steps. In the first step, if an indicator crosses its calculated optimal cut-off, it is assigned a
value of 1 and it is weighed proportionately to its predictive power. Each indicator’s weight in the
group wi,g can be expressed as:
wi,g =
1− TME(C∗i )∑
∀i∈g(1− TME(C∗i ))
(4.4)
In the second step, the predictive power of the cluster indices is evaluated and the indicators are
aggregated in the fiscal stress index based on their own predictive power and the predictive power
of the cluster indices:
Overall Index =
∑
g
wg∑
∀i∈g
wi,gdi
 (4.5)
where wg is the weight of the group, and di is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the indicator
is above (below) the threshold, and zero otherwise.
4.4 RESULTS
4.4.1 Data
The analysis uses 12 fiscal indicators (Baldacci, McHugh and Petrova, 2011),13 classified into three
clusters: basic fiscal variables, long-term fiscal trends, and asset and liability management. The
data were obtained from the IMF’s Fiscal Monitor, the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO),
the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), and United Nations databases. While some data are
available for the period 1970-2010, most series start in the 1980s and are available for all countries
only for the mid-1990s. Therefore, while the complete dataset is used to estimate the thresholds,
the analysis focuses on the period after 1995.
13The following fiscal indicators are included: the difference between GDP growth and the imputed interest rate on
government debt (r-g); cyclically adjusted primary balance; general government gross debt to GDP; gross financing
needs; short-term debt (on a remaining maturity basis) to total debt; debt denominated in foreign currencies to
total debt for emerging economies/debt held by nonresidents to total debt for advanced economies; weighted average
maturity of government debt; short-term external debt to international reserves for emerging economies; deviation of
fertility rate from 2.1; old age dependency ratio; and long-term projections of the change in public pension and health
expenditure. See Baldacci, McHugh and Petrova (2011) and IMF (2011) for a detailed definition of these indicators.
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The analysis of the fiscal indicators reveals that the global financial crisis started in 2008 has
triggered a pronounced deterioration in the basic fiscal variables (e.g., public debt to GDP ratio
and the cyclically adjusted primary balance as a ratio of potential GDP) in advanced countries,
leading also to a sharp upturn in gross financing needs (Figure 4.3). With long-term pension and
health expenditure costs on an upward trend, risks of fiscal stress are expected to have increased
in recent years.
In emerging economies, the basic fiscal indicators show that the deterioration in the cyclically
adjusted primary balance had started before the outset of the crisis. Nonetheless, public debt to
GDP has remained lower than historical levels. Asset and liability management variables have
deteriorated since 2008, mostly on account of large deficit financing needs. However, financing
conditions have also worsened, with short-term debt reaching levels seen during the Latin American
and the Asian crises of the mid 1990s. Variables measuring long-term fiscal challenges are also
trending up in emerging economies, but to a lesser extent than in advanced economies.
4.4.2 Indicator Thresholds and Weights
The estimation of the indicator thresholds is based on the performance of the TME and SNR
approaches. The TME method performs better, in line with previous results in the literature (IMF,
2007).14 Nonetheless, adjustments to the TME methodology are necessary for several reasons. First,
occasionally the TME solution is located close to the median of the distribution and in some case
on the tail of the distribution where values of the indicators indicate low risk of fiscal distress.15
Second, trends and structural breaks in the data are likely over long time periods. Finally, data
are reliably available only since the mid-1990s.
To maximize the predictive power of the indicator, the thresholds are estimated separately for
advanced and emerging economies under the constraints that they are located on the risk-prone
side of each indicator’s distribution relative to the 1995-2010 median (Figures 4.4 and 4.5). This is
14As expected, the SNR approach leads to higher total errors; specifically, this method can force the solution to
very high type II errors, yielding thresholds with very high percentages of missed crises and misclassified non-crises.
15In general, the indicators may not have an easily identified region that comes out of well-behaved CDFs, leading
to corner solutions. Such cases were encountered when using a larger set of fiscal variables, including social spending
and the slope of the yield curve. Solutions to such cases vary from using bootstrapping to assigning zero weights to
the variables in the index. A preferred approach, however, was to use a parsimonious set of indicators, exhibiting
well-behaved data properties.
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Figure 4.3: Trends in Selected Fiscal Indicators
Sources: World Economic Outlook, Bank of International Settlements, Dealogic; and authors’ calculations. See
Appendix C.1 for the definition of fiscal indicators.
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obtained by removing a few outliers16, which allows more robust threshold estimation.17
The estimated thresholds and the implied signaling power of the indicators determine the rela-
tive weight that a variable has in the fiscal stress index. Signaling power is defined as one minus the
total error and it is a measure of the statistical power of the variable. As discussed in Section 4.2,
predictive errors produced by EWS methodologies are typically non-negligible. The focus of the
exercise, however, is on the relative performance of the fiscal variables and their role in detecting
fiscal vulnerability. This is shown by the relative signal intensity for each variable (signaling power).
Information on the performance of individual indicators is presented in Tables 4.5 (advanced
economies) and 4.6 (emerging economies). The first column shows the number of crises for which
data on the indicator are available. The third column shows a measure of the tendency of indicators
to issue good signals. This is defined as the number of good signals issued by the indicator as a
percentage of total crises observations (TP (C∗i )/NCi). The fourth column measures the perfor-
mance of indicators regarding sending bad signals as a percentage of total non-crises observations
(FP (C∗i )/NNCi). The last column shows the value of the loss function minimized, which is the sum
of type I and type II errors.
To put the model’s performance in perspective, Table 4.7 shows the overall performance of two
leading methodologies in the literature used for currency crises. While the nature of vulnerabilities
is different in our study, we show that our model’s performance is comparable to that typically
found in the literature with respect to measures such as the percentage of pre-crisis observations
correctly called, and the percentage of false alarms to total non-crises observations.
16These are defined as observations with high absolute levels of the standardized score, based on subtracting the
mean of the fiscal indicator distribution and dividing by its standard deviation.
17Basic fiscal variables are subject to such adjustment, as well as gross financing needs and the fertility rate indicator.
In some cases (weighted average maturity and debt held by nonresidents to total public debt for advanced economies)
the threshold is located in the crisis-prone side of the distribution and it is selected without further adjustment of the
data. These adjustments make some of the thresholds more plausible, while increasing the precision of the estimates.
Including outliers in the estimation of the threshold would reduce the explanatory power of some variables. Excluding
the indicators for which outliers were removed would, however, have a larger impact on the results.
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Figure 4.4: Advanced Economies: Fiscal Indicator Medians and Thresholds
Note: Median for the period 1995-2010. See Appendix C.1 for the definition of fiscal indicators.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 4.5: Emerging Market Economies: Fiscal Indicator Medians and Thresholds
Note: Median for the period 1995-2010. See Appendix C.1 for the definition of fiscal indicators.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 4.5: Advanced Economies: Thresholds and Relative Weights of Fiscal Indicators
Indicator Crisis Threshold Good Bad Loss Index
obs. Signals Signals function Weight
Basic Fiscal Variables 31.59
r-g (5 year average) 21 3.6 71 48 77 14.9
General government gross debt (% GDP) 15 72.2 33 22 89 7.3
Cyclically adjusted primary balance (% potential GDP) 5 -4.2 60 45 85 9.4
Asset and Liability Management 42.56
Gross financing needs (% GDP) 6 17.2 83 45 62 24.6
Share of short term debt (ratio of total debt) 15 9.1 100 96 96 2.8
Debt held by nonresidents (% total debt) 7 83.6 21 6 85 10.1
Weighted average maturity of general government debt (years) 18 3.9 7 9 92 5.0
Long-Term Fiscal Trend 25.85
Fertility rate (deviation from 2.1) 31 0.64 29 25 96 2.4
Long-Term projections of public health expenditure (% GDP) 28 4.5 68 53 85 9.4
Long-Term projections of public pension expenditure (% GDP) 21 6.2 24 9 85 9.6
Dependency ratio 37 36 14 6 92 4.5
Overall Index 39 0.15 49 26 77
Table 4.6: Emerging Economies: Thresholds and Relative Weights of Fiscal Indicators
Indicator Crisis Threshold Good Bad Loss Index
obs. Signals Signals function Weight
Basic Fiscal Variables 23.72
r-g (5 year average) 52 1.1 75 58 83 11.3
General government gross debt (% GDP) 20 42.8 65 61 96 2.5
Cyclically adjusted primary balance (% potential GDP) 60 -0.5 48 33 85 9.9
Asset and Liability Management 43.56
Gross financing needs (% GDP) 29 20.6 31 27 96 2.8
Share of short term debt (ratio of total debt) 45 44.0 29 15 86 9.2
Debt denominated in foreign currencies (% total debt) 52 40.3 85 70 85 9.9
Weighted average maturity of general government debt (years) 40 2.3 15 11 96 2.6
Short term external debt (% gross international reserves) 101 61.8 72 43 71 19.1
Long-Term Fiscal Trend 32.73
Fertility rate (deviation from 2.1) 60 1.3 95 87 92 5.2
Long-Term projections of public health expenditure (% GDP) 28 2.7 50 38 88 8.2
Long-Term projections of public pension expenditure (% GDP) 5 4.0 80 60 80 13.4
Dependency ratio 81 16.1 49 40 91 5.9
Overall Index 99 0.47 64 33 69
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Table 4.7: Comparing Model Performance
Study Good Bad Loss
Signals Signals Function
Current Study - Advanced Economies 49 26 77
Current Study - Emerging Markets 64 33 69
KLR (1998) - Signaling Approacha 41 15 74
Berg and Patillo (1999) - Probit Model 47 13 66
aThese numbers are taken from Berg and Patillo (1999).
The top predictors of fiscal stress are different for advanced and emerging economies.18 In
the advanced economies, government rollover pressures are associated with the size of financing
needs and fiscal solvency concerns, while for emerging economies liquidity constraints are the main
signal of fiscal stress. This finding underlies the different economic structure and weaknesses that
characterize these countries. When advanced economies are vulnerable to market financing shocks,
this is generally in response to evidence of an unsustainable debt path. With about one third
of the fiscal stress index determined by international liquidity and the currency composition of
government debt, emerging economies are more exposed to “original sin” problems and spillovers
from financial markets.19
A logit regression is used to assess the ability of the fiscal stress index to provide early warn-
ing signals on fiscal sustainability risks. This is done by plotting the fiscal stress index and the
probability of entering into fiscal stress (and remaining in stress after an episode has started). The
fiscal stress index components are all significant determinants of fiscal stress episodes. The corre-
lation is higher with basic fiscal variables, whereas the other components of the index have a lower
18In both advanced countries and emerging economies the nature of fiscal sustainability risks has changed over
time as population aging has emerged as a key fiscal risk and economies have gained market access. This is reflected
in the changes over time in the weights that the indicators have on the fiscal stress index when they are calculated
for sub-periods of time.
19“Original sin” is the inability of emerging market economies to finance externally in domestic currency (Eichen-
green, B., Hausmann, R., Panizza, U., 2002). With a small domestic investor base, a government that resorts to
heavy external borrowing is exposed to substantial foreign currency risk.
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correlation-although their coefficients are highly significant (Figure 4.6).20
Figure 4.6: Advanced Economies: Probability of Fiscal Crisis at Different Levels of the Fiscal Stress
Index
Note: Cumulative marginal effect of the fiscal stress index and its components with 95-percent confidence bands.
Source: Authors’ estimations.
In emerging economies, the relationship between fiscal crises and the fiscal stress index follows a
similar pattern, with a narrower confidence interval than for advanced countries (Figure 4.7). The
correlation between the fiscal stress index and probability of experiencing a fiscal crisis is driven
primarily by the asset and liability management variables for these countries.21
20Notice that the dependent variable in this case includes the periods of fiscal stress after the first year in which a
crisis occurs. This is different from the definition of fiscal stress episodes used for the construction of the index and
can help assess how the index helps predict the level of risk once the event has occurred. This also explains why basic
fiscal variables have a stronger weight in the regression results than in the fiscal stress index, as they are associated
with more persistent stress spells.
21Multivariate logit regressions confirm these results, with basic fiscal variables having the largest marginal effect
in advanced economies, and the asset and liability management component having the largest marginal effect in
emerging market economies.
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Figure 4.7: Emerging Economies: Probability of Fiscal Crisis at Different Levels of the Fiscal Stress
Index
Note: Cumulative marginal effect of the fiscal stress index and its components with 95-percent confidence bands.
Source: Authors’ estimations.
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4.4.3 Fiscal Stress Index Trends
Fiscal stress has increased more rapidly in advanced than in emerging economies. In 2011, the
fiscal stress index-weighted with countries’ PPP-GDP- is higher in advanced countries (Figures 4.8
and 4.9).22 Overall, in advanced economies the fiscal stress index has doubled since 2006 and is at
record-high levels. In contrast, in emerging economies the fiscal stress index is elevated, but still
slightly below the peak experienced during the financial crises of the late 1990s.23
Figure 4.8: Fiscal Stress Index, 1995-2011
Note: PPP-GDP weights used to calculate the weighted average index.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Decomposing the fiscal stress index for advanced economies reveals that its increase since the
mid-2000s is a result of a sharp deterioration in the basic fiscal variables-mainly debt to GDP and the
cyclically adjusted primary balance (Figure 4.10). The asset and liability management component
has also peaked, contributing for about half of the increase in the index. Long-term fiscal indicators
have also exerted continuous pressure on the fiscal stress index. In emerging economies, the main
factors behind the increase in the fiscal stress index have been the basic fiscal variables, followed by
the long-term fiscal trends. The asset and liability management component-mostly due to declining
short-term debt to international reserves-has kept the index from increasing further.
Focusing on the regional differences (Figure 4.11), in advanced economies, the fiscal stress index
is highest in North America, although the peak levels of the index are observed in peripheral euro
22The unweighted average index is useful in gauging how the index fares compared to the incidence of fiscal crisis
and the number of countries in fiscal stress. The weighted average is useful in assessing the systemic importance of
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Figure 4.9: Fiscal Stress Index, 1995-2011
Note: PPP-GDP weights used to calculate the weighted average index.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Figure 4.10: Contribution of the Fiscal Stress Index Components, 1996-2011
Note: Unweighted fiscal stress index. It measures the change in the index compared to the base year in percent.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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countries. In emerging economies, the fiscal stress index is markedly higher in Emerging Europe,
followed by countries in the Middle East and North Africa.
Figure 4.11: Fiscal Stress Index Levels by Region, 2011
Note: Unweighted fiscal stress index.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
In the last five years, the index has increased sharply in North America (Figure 4.12). This
is mainly due to deterioration in the cyclically adjusted primary balance and a sharp increase in
debt and gross financing needs. While in Asia and the Pacific the index has increased the least, it
has been on an upward trend for the last 15 years. This is due to underlying demographic trends,
putting pressure on the long-term fiscal component of the index, as well as rising debt and large
gross financing needs.
In emerging economies, over the last five years the index has increased the most in Latin
American countries, due to peaking cyclically adjusted primary deficits, in a few cases accompanied
by declining debt maturity and international reserve coverage of short-term debt. In Emerging
the fiscal stress index dynamics.
23As the two indices are constructed independently and therefore also have different levels, using a common scaling
year helps compare the behavior of fiscal stress across country groupings. The trends in the indices, when commonly
scaled, are indicative of the developments in fiscal vulnerability among the two groups.
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Figure 4.12: Fiscal Stress Index Changes by Region, 1996-2011
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Europe, the index has remained elevated throughout 1996-2011. This is not only due to the
solvency indicators, but also worsening asset and liability management risks-high ratio of foreign
currency denominated debt and low reserve coverage of short-term debt-in addition to growing
concerns about the long-term fiscal outlook.
4.5 CONCLUSIONS
The fiscal stress index presented in this paper provides a signaling tool to assess exposure to fiscal
sustainability risks and helps identify the factors underlying changes in fiscal stress risks. However,
like similar early warning tools, the stress index does not attempt to predict crises, which are
typically triggered by a combination of economic, financial, or political shocks. While signaling
tools like the fiscal stress index presented here are important to assess vulnerabilities, they should
be complemented by judgment-based approaches.
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This paper calculates thresholds that identify the likelihood of fiscal stress for a large set of
fiscal variables. These thresholds are based on an EWS methodology and are used to construct
a summary index of fiscal sustainability risks for advanced economies and emerging markets. In
contrast with previous studies, the fiscal stress index relies on a broader definition of crisis episodes,
consistent with the conceptual framework developed by Cottarelli (2011). In calculating the fiscal
stress index, this paper uses a parsimonious set of fiscal indicators proposed by Baldacci, McHugh
and Petrova (2011).
The fiscal stress index is calculated for a large sample of advanced and emerging economies
during 1995-2011. Results show that in advanced countries the top predictors of fiscal stress are
indicators of gross financing needs and fiscal solvency risks. In emerging economies, the best pre-
dictors of fiscal stress are risks associated with public debt structure and exposure to spillovers from
financial markets. Fiscal stress risk has increased dramatically across the world as a consequence
of the global financial crisis. Risks are higher in advanced economies than in emerging economies,
but remain higher than before the crisis in the latter group. North America and Europe are the
regions were fiscal stress risks are highest.
There is scope for further extensions based on the analysis presented in this paper. In particular,
bootstrapping methods could be used to gauge the uncertainty surrounding the point estimates.
Another avenue of further research is to conduct the analysis using thresholds based on country-
specific distributions (as in Hemming et al., 2003) instead of using an overall threshold, in order
to control for country-specific characteristics. Using time-specific effects could also prove useful in
view of the common factors that affect many countries during periods of global contagion.
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APPENDIX A
FIGURES
A.1 DATA FIGURES WITH THE HP-TREND
Figure A1: A Plot of U.S. Logged Private Consumption With The HP Trend
A.2 LIKELIHOOD CONTOUR PLOTS
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Figure A2: A Plot of U.S. Logged Private Investment With The HP Trend
Figure A3: A Plot of U.S. Logged Hours Worked With The HP Trend
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Figure A4: A Plot of U.S. Logged Government Components With The HP Trend
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Figure A5: One-Dimensional Plots of the Likelihood Function around Estimated Parameters
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Figure A6: Two-Dimensional Plots of the Likelihood Function around Estimated Parameters
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APPENDIX B
MODEL SOLUTION
B.1 THE NON-LINEAR SYSTEM
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APPENDIX C
DATA SOURCES
C.1 FISCAL INDICATORS
Debt default: Period of domestic or foreign bonded and bank debt default (available from Stan-
dard and Poor’s 1970-2008).
IMF-supported programs: Period of IMF-supported program exceeding 100 percent of IMF
member’s quota (available from IMF 1970-2010).
Inflation rate: In percent: period during which inflation exceeds 35 percent per annum for
AE, or 500 percent per annum for EMs (available from IMF/IFS 1970-2010).
Bond yield pressure: Government bond spreads (relative to 10-year US Treasury bond)
exceeding 2 standard deviations above the historical annual mean of the country, or 1000 basis
points on annual basis; or at least 6 months in a year based on monthly data (available from
IMF/IFS 1970-2010).
r-g (5-year average): Imputed interest rate on general government debt, deflated by the GDP
deflator, minus real GDP growth rate. Five year forward moving average (available from WEO
1971-2010 for advanced economies, and 1985-2010 for emerging economies).
Cyclical adjusted primary balances: Expressed as a percentage of potential GDP (available
from WEO 1979-2010 for advanced economies, and 1984-2010 for emerging economies).
General government gross/net debt: Expressed in percent of GDP. Net debt used for
Japan and Canada, gross debt for all other countries (available from WEO 1970-2010 for advanced
economies, and 1982-2010 for emerging economies).
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Total fertility rate: The average number of children per woman (available from UN 1970-
2010).
Old age dependency ratio: 20 years ahead projections of the ratio of population over 65,
divided by the number of adults (available from UN 1970-2010).
Long-term projections of the change in public pension expenditure: Expressed in
percent of GDP, the change in projected expenditures 30 year ahead relative to the base year
(available from IMF staff estimates 1980-2010).
Long-term projections of the change in public health expenditure: Expressed in
percent of GDP, the change in projected expenditures 30 year ahead relative to the base year
(available from IMF staff estimates 1979-2010 for advanced economies, and 1995-2010 for emerging
economies).
Current gross financing need: Projected general government overall balance plus general
government debt with a maturity of one year or less. Expressed in percent of GDP (available from
WEO,VEE 1990-2010 for advanced economies, and 1993-2010 for emerging economies).
Share of short-term debt as a ratio of total debt: Short-term debt is defined as general
government debt with remaining maturity of one year or less. Total debt is general government
gross debt (available from BIS 1989-2010).
Debt denominated in foreign currencies: General government debt, expressed in terms of
total debt (available from WEO,VEE 1990-2010 for emerging economies).
Debt held by non-residents as a proportion of total debt: Includes both domestic and
foreign currency debt issued. Expressed as a proportion of total debt (available from JEDH,WEO
1980-2010 for advanced economies).
Weighted average maturity of general government debt: Historical data calculated by
staff; current data available in Bloomberg (available from Bloomberg; Dealogic 1980-2010).
Short-term external debt to international reserves: Short-term debt is defined as general
government debt with remaining maturity of one year or less (available from WEO,IFS 1990-2010
for advanced economies, and 1970-2010 for emerging economies).
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